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The realistic Schrodinger’s and positivistic Born’s interpretation of the wave function
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142432 Chernogolovka, Moscow District, Russia E-mail: nikulov@iptm.ru
The controversies about quantum mechanics, in the old days and present-day, reveal an inconsis-
tency of understanding of this most successful theory of physics. Therefore it is needed to set forth
unambiguously what and how quantum mechanics describes in order to cut down the number of
the fantasies trying to eliminate the fundamental obscurity in quantum mechanics. In this chapter
reader’s attention is drawn first of all to a non-universality of quantum-mechanical descriptions
of different quantum phenomena. The realistic interpretation of the wave function proposed by
Schrodinger is used at the description of most quantum phenomena whereas the controversies touch
on the positivistic interpretation proposed by Born. These controversies are result, in the main, of
the misinterpretation, proposed by Bohr, of the orthodox quantum mechanics. Most physicists, fol-
lowing Bohr, did not want to admit that Born had assumed in fact a mutual causal relation between
quantum system and the mind of the observer. The EPR correlation is non-local and quantum
mechanics predicts violation of the Bell’s inequalities because of non-locality of the mind of the
observer. The quantum postulate and complementarity proposed by Bohr are valid according to
rather hidden-variables theories than the orthodox quantum mechanics. Measurement is described
as process of interaction of quantum system with the measuring device in hidden-variables theories
alternative of quantum mechanics. It is shown, that the mutual causal relation between ’res extensa’
and ’res cogitans’, presupposed with the Born’s interpretation, results to a logical absurdity which
testifies against the self-consistency of the orthodox quantum mechanic. This self-contradiction is
a consequence of logical mistakes inherent in a new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisenberg for a
philosophical substantiation of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is successful in spite of
this absurdity and these mistakes because rather the realistic Schrodinger’s interpretation than the
positivistic Born’s interpretation is used at the description of the majority of quantum phenom-
ena. The act of measurement and the fundamental obscurity connected with it are absent at this
description. But there are other fundamental obscurities which are considered in the last section.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful the-
ory. It has given rise to revolutionary technologies of
the XX century. The progress of physics of last century
are fairly connected with the QM. But John Bell said in
his Introductory remarks ”Speakable and unspeakable in
quantum mechanics” at Naples-Amalfi meeting, May 7,
1984 that ”This progress is made in spite of the funda-
mental obscurity in quantum mechanics”, see p. 170 in
2[1]. This fundamental obscurity as well as QM are re-
sult of the proposal by young Werner Heisenberg [2] to
describe observables instead of beables, see these terms
in the Bell’s paper [3]. This proposal to abandon any
attempt to find a unified picture of objective reality had
provoked the battle between creators of quantum the-
ory. Bohr, Pauli, Dirac and others admitted the Heisen-
berg’s proposal whereas Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie
and others rejected the repudiation of the science aim as
the discovery of the real. Schrodinger interpreted his
wave function as a real wave [4] and defended this real-
istic interpretation [5]. He tried to replace particles by
wavepackets. ”But wavepackets diffuse” [6]. This diffuse-
ness contradicts numerous observation. Therefore the in-
terpretation of the Schrodinger’s wave function as prob-
ability amplitudes proposed by Born was fully accepted
by most physicists. This positivistic interpretation corre-
sponds to the Heisenberg’s proposal and just therefore it
results to the fundamental obscurity and mass delusion.
Indeterminism, subjectivity, non-locality and vagueness
implied with this interpretation are enough obvious. But
only few physicists, Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie and
some others worried about these ”philosophical” prob-
lems during a long time. Most physicists, as Bell said
”stride through that obscurity unimpeded... sleepwalk-
ing?”, see p. 170 in [1]. Bell worried about this obscu-
rity of positivistic QM but even he said: ”The progress
so made is immensely impressive. If it is made by sleep-
walkers, is it wise to shout ’wake up’? I am not sure
that it is. So I speak now in a very low voice”, see p. 170
in[1].
But now it is needed to shout ”wake up” [7]. There are
some reasons why it is needed: 1) numerous false pub-
lications because of misunderstanding of QM [7–9]; 2)
misunderstanding of the idea of quantum computation
[10]; 3) some authors, because of their implicit belief in
QM, claim already that it is possible to prove experi-
mentally that ”The moon - a small moon, admittedly -
is not there” [11]; 4) on the other hand many physicists
have already refused this implicit belief in QM. The most
striking illustration of the fourth reason is the Action
of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology
”Fundamental Problems in Quantum Physics” [12]. The
first aim of research - observer-free formulation of QM
witnesses to perception by numerous participants of the
Action MP1006 that no subjectivity can be permissible
in any physical theory. But I should say that only this
perception does not indicate that these scientists have
’waked up’ completely.
They have not realized for the present a primary logi-
cal mistake of the sleepwalkers creating QM. Scientists
have in mind always that any physical theory should
describe universally all its subject matters. For exam-
ple, everyone believes that the Newton’s laws describe
universally the motion of all object with different mass,
from major planets to smallest particles. This belief may
be justified with a universality of the laws governing a
unique objective reality. Orthodox QM, in contrast to
all others theories of physics, describes rather different
phenomena than a unique reality. No description of phe-
nomena should be universal if they are not considered as
a universal manifestation of a unique reality. Therefore
it is logical mistake to think that QM should describe
universally all quantum phenomena. Nevertheless QM
was developed and interpreted up to now as a univer-
sal theory. General confidence predominates that only
the positivistic Born’s interpretation but not the realistic
Schrodinger’s interpretation can be valid for description
of all quantum phenomena.
This confidence is obviously false. Richard Feynman
in the Section ”The Schrodinger Equation in a Classical
Context: A Seminar on Superconductivity” of his Lec-
tures on Physics [13] stated that Schrodinger ”imagined
incorrectly that |Ψ|2 was the electric charge density of the
electron. It was Born who correctly (as far as we know)
interpreted the Ψ of the Schrodinger equation in terms
of a probability amplitude”. But further Feynman wrote
that ”in a situation in which Ψ is the wave function for
each of an enormous number of particles which are all in
the same state, |Ψ|2 can be interpreted as the density of
particles”. Thus, Feynman had pointed out that the pos-
itivistic Born’s interpretation could be replaced with the
realistic Schrodinger’s interpretation at the description of
macroscopic quantum phenomena, at least. This fact has
fundamental importance because ”There are two funda-
mentally different ways in which the state function can
change” [14] according to the Born’s interpretation: the
discontinuous change at the observation (Process 1 ac-
cording to [14]) and the continuous deterministic change
of state of an isolated system with time according to
a Schrodinger’s wave equation (Process 2 according to
[14]). Hugh Everett noted correctly that because of the
Process 1 ”No way is evidently be applied the conven-
tional formulation of QM to a system that is not subject
to external observation” and that ”The question cannot
be ruled out as lying in the domain of psychology” [14].
But only select few realized this fundamental obscurity in
QM in that time. Feynman did not realized. Therefore
he did not attach great importance to the replacement of
the Born’s interpretation by the Schrodinger’s interpre-
tation. Feynman did not understand that the Process 1,
and all fundamental problems connected with it, disap-
pear at this replacement.
Richard Feynman and Hugh Everett were doctoral stu-
dents of the same doctoral advisor - John Archibald
Wheeler. But their conception of QM was fundamen-
tally different. Such dissent marks out QM from other
theories of physics. The dissent was from the very out-
set of QM. It was observed both between defenders of
QM, for example Heisenberg and Bohr, and its critics,
for example Schrodinger and de Broglie. But now the
diversity of opinion is unusually wide. Einstein wrote
as far back as 1928 to Schrodinger [15]: ”The soothing
philosophy-or religion?-of Heisenberg-Bohr is so cleverly
concocted that it offers the believers a soft resting pillow
from which they are not easily chased away”, see the cite
3on the page 99 of [16]. The diversity of opinion about QM
witnesses that Einstein’s words turned out prophetic: the
dissent can be about a religion but our right comprehen-
sion must be unified. At least we must believe that it is
possible. Otherwise no science could be possible. There-
fore first of all it is important to show that subjectivity,
non-locality, indeterminism and vagueness of QM are de-
duced unambiguously from the Born’s interpretation. It
will be made in the next Section. This positivistic in-
terpretation can be valid and understood correctly only
in a new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisenberg. This
new Weltanschauung will be considered shortly in the
Section 3. Unfortunately only few scientists have re-
alized that the correct understanding of QM demands
the new Weltanschauung. Both mass delusion connected
with this lack of understanding and mistakes made by
Heisenberg will be considered in the Section 4. Mistakes
of other type connected with the misinterpretation of
quantum mechanics an a universal theory will be con-
sidered in the Section 5. The fundamental obscurities in
quantum mechanics worrying Einstein, Schrodinger, Bell
and others disappear with the realistic interpretation of
wave function proposed by Schrodinger. But other fun-
damental obscurities appear with this realistic interpre-
tation. These fundamental obscurities of other type will
be considered in the Section 6.
2. WHAT IS IMPLIED WITH THE BORN’S
INTERPRETATION OF THE WAVE FUNCTION?
Feynman wrote [13] when Schrodinger ”imagined in-
correctly that |Ψ|2 was the electric charge density of the
electron He soon found on doing a number of problems
that it didn’t work out quite right”. Schrodinger had tried
to replace ’particles’ by wave-packets
Ψ(r) =
∫
∞
−∞
dp[A0(p) exp−
i
~
Et] exp
i
~
pr (1)
But this wave-packets spreads in empty space, for exam-
ple, when the energy E = p2/2m. Therefore the real
wave-packets cannot explain the observations of parti-
cle localized in the space, for example particle tracks in
track chambers. Because of this and other defections
of the Schrodinger’s interpretation most physicists had
accepted the Born’s interpretation. Most of they stride
unimpeded through the nonsense that the wave-packets
can be localized only under influence of the mind of the
observer.
2.1. ’Measurement’ might be complete only in the
mind of the observer
Feynman wrote [13] that Born had proposed ”very dif-
ficult idea that the square of the amplitude is not the
charge density but is only the probability per unit volume
of finding an electron there, and that when you do find the
electron some place the entire charge is there”. Feynman
was sure that this idea is correct because he did not raise
the question: ”How can the entire charge be there when
an observer has found the electron some place?” Let con-
sider the electron in empty space, or better a fullerene, or
even a long biomolecule, quantum interference of which
was observed already [17, 18]. Quantum state of such
particle can be described with the wave-packets (1) in
which the wave functions expi(pr − Et)/~ are deduced
from the Schrodinger’s wave equation [19]
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= −
~
2
2m
∇2Ψ+ U(r)Ψ (2)
whereas the amplitudes A0(p) can be estimate only with
help of an observation at a time t = 0. According to (2)
E = p2/2m in empty space where U(r) = 0. It is possi-
ble, for example with help of the scanning laser ionization
detector used in [20], to observe at t = 0 that a fullerene,
for example, is localised in a space region ∆r near r = 0.
The result of this observation may be describe approx-
imately with the probability density function Ψ(r) =
(2pi)−1/4σ−1/2exp(−r2/4σ2) [13] where σ ≈ ∆r/3. The
wave-packet (1) diffuses, Fig.1, because its amplitudes,
equal A0(p) = (8pi)
1/4σ1/2exp(−p2σ2/~2) at t = 0,
change with time A(p, t) = (8pi)1/4σ1/2exp(−p2σ2/~2 −
ip2t/~2m). Because of this Process 2 [14] the probabil-
ity to observe the particle in a space region near r = 0
decreases and far off r = 0 increases with time, Fig.1.
The Process 2 is continuous and is determined with the
Schrodinger’s wave equation (2). But the discontinuous
change of the probability |Ψ(r, t)|2 and the wave-packet
Ψ(r, t) at an observation, i.e. the Process 1 [14], can not
be described with this equation (2).
The Process 1, at t = t1 for example, Fig.1, cannot be
described outside the domain of psychology. Everett [14]
was right. No physical interaction of the particle with
photons radiated with laser or any measuring device can
compact the wave-packet. It is quite obvious that ac-
cording to the Born’s interpretation the wave-packet is
squeezed in a smaller volume because of the observation
by an observer the particle near, for example, r ≈ 8,
Fig.1. The observation changes first of all the mind of the
observer. Before the observation at t < t1 he conjectured
to see the particle in any space region with a probability
|Ψ(r, t1)|
2. His knowledge changes discontinuously when
he sees the particle near r ≈ 8, Fig.1. Such change of the
knowledge takes place at any observation. Schrodinger
noted that ”· · · the simple statement, that each observa-
tion depends both from the object and the subject which
’are entangled’ by extremely complex manner is a state-
ment which is hardly possible to consider new, it is old
almost also, as the science” [21]. But according to QM
”· · · the causal interconnection between the subject and
object is considered reciprocal. It is stated, that the unre-
movable and uncontrollable influence of the subject on the
object takes place” [21]. According to the Born’s inter-
pretation both the observer knowledge and the quantum
state change at the observation.
4FIG. 1: The initial conditions, i.e. the amplitudes A0(p) of
the wave-packet (1) are determined with results of an external
observation at a time moment t = 0, i.e. during the Process
1, when the quantum state changes discontinuously under in-
fluence of an external observer (the upper picture). Quantum
mechanics can predict the probability |Ψ(r, t1)|
2 per unit vol-
ume of finding the particle in any space place r at any time
moment t1 (the middle picture) using the initial conditions
and the Schrodinger’s wave equation (2). But no physical
interaction of the particle with an agency of observation de-
scribed with the Schrodinger’s wave equation (2) can compact
the wave-packet (the bottom picture) and provide with new
initial conditions. The initial conditions can be provided only
the mind of the observer who has found the particle some
place.
It could be clear from the very outset that according to
the Born’s interpretation the observation should be inter-
preted unambiguously as interplay between the quantum
system and the mind of the observer. But Heisenberg and
Bohr had convinced most physicists that we can consider
the act of the observation (measurement) as an interac-
tion between quantum system and measuring instrument.
The famous [16] Heisenberg uncertainty microscope [22],
the quantum postulate and complementarity by Bohr [23]
have misled some generations of physicists. Even the fa-
mous EPR paper [24] and the Bell’s works [1] could not
undeceive most physicists about this error up to now.
Bell wrote in 1989 [24] about the paper ’Ten theorems
about quantum mechanical measurements’, by NG van
Kampen [26] ”This paper is distinguished especially by
its robust common sense. The author has no patience
with ’· · · such mind-boggling fantasies as the many world
interpretation · · ·’. He dismisses out of hand the notion
of von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner - that ’measurement’
might be complete only in the mind of the observer: ’. .
. I find it hard to understand that someone who arrives
at such a conclusion does not seek the error in his argu-
ment’”. There is important to remind that Everett had
proposed the many world interpretation in order to de-
scribe the Process 1, i.e. ’measurement’, as lying outside
the domain of psychology [14]. But the believers in the
soothing philosophy or religion of Heisenberg-Bohr reject
flatly, as well as van Kampen [26], both the mind of the
observer and the many world interpretation. Although
it must be obvious that the attempt by Heisenberg and
Bohr to propose the realistic substantiation of the un-
certainty principle was false it is needed to explain again
and again that EPR correlation and Bell’s inequalities
have proved this obvious fact.
2.2. EPR correlation and the non-locality of the
mind
Bell wrote in 1981 [27]: ”The philosopher in the street,
who has not suffered a course in quantum mechanics,
is quite unimpressed by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen corre-
lations. He can point to many examples of similar cor-
relations in everyday life. The case of Bertlmann’s socks
is often cited. Dr. Bertlmann likes to wear two socks of
different colours. Which colour he will have on a given
foot on a given day is quite unpredictable. But when you
see that the first sock is pink you can be already sure that
the second sock will not be pink”. The last sentence de-
scribes the influence of the object (the first sock) on the
subject (the mind of the observer). Such influence can
astonish nobody because ”it is old almost also, as the
science” [21]. Bell asked: ”And is not the EPR business
just the same?” [27]. He considered a particular version
of the EPR paradox [24], developed by David Bohm [28],
i.e. the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken exper-
iment with two spin 1/2 particles. Quantum mechanics
describes the spin states of two separate particles with
5two separate equations
ψA = αA| ↑A (rA) > +βA| ↓A (rA) >
ψB = αB | ↑B (rB) > +βB| ↓B (rB) > (3)
where the probability amplitudes αA, βA, αB, βB depend
on a free choice of a certain axis along which the compo-
nent of particle spin will be measured and |αA|
2+|βA|
2 =
1, |αB|
2+ |βB|
2 = 1 always. The spin state of pair of two
separate particle may be described also with the product
of the equations (3) in which the amplitudes γ1 = αAαB,
γ2 = αAβB, γ3 = βAαB, γ4 = βAβB and as a conse-
quence γ1γ4 = αAαBβAβB = γ2γ3 = αAβBβAαB. The
EPR correlation takes place when γ1γ4 6= γ2γ3 and the
spin states of the particles cannot be separated. Two
particles in the singlet spin state
ψEPR = γ2| ↑A (rA) ↓B (rB) > +γ3| ↓A (rA) ↑B (rB) >
(4)
when γ1 = 0, γ4 = 0, and γ2 6= 0, γ3 6= 0 is called EPR
pair. The axis along which the component of particle
spin will be measured is the direction of a non-uniform
magnetic field produced by magnets of a Stern-Gerlach
analyzer [16]. The particles will deflect up in the state
| ↑> and down in the state | ↓>. The observers A (Alice)
and B (Bob) can choose any direction of their analyzer’s
axis. Whether either particle separately goes up or down
on a given occasion is quite unpredictable. But according
to the basic principle of quantum mechanics formulated
by Dirac as far back as 1930 [29] ”· · · a measurement al-
ways causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the
dynamical variable that is being measured”. This Dirac
jump, wave function collapse [30], or ”’quantum jump’
from the ’possible’ to the ’actual’” [31] must take place
logically during the act of observation because Alice can-
not see that one particle deflects up and down simulta-
neously. When Alice sees that the particle deflects up in
her Stern-Gerlach analyzer directed along an axis n the
spin state of the EPR pair (4) changes discontinuously
to the eigenstate
ψn = | ↑A (rA) ↓B (rB) >n (5a)
or to the eigenstate
ψn = | ↓A (rA) ↑B (rB) >n (5b)
when the particle deflects down. Thus, according to
the basic principles of quantum mechanics deduced logi-
cally from the Born’s interpretation one particle A of the
EPR pair (4) goes up the other B always goes down and
vice-versa when axis of two analyzers located at widely
separated points in space rA and rB is directed in the
same direction n. This EPR correlation should be non-
local because of the opportunity to observe the deflec-
tion of the particle A and the particle B at the same
time independently on the distance |rA − rB | between
the Stern-Gerlach analyzers. This non-locality is deduced
unambiguously from the Born’s interpretation as a con-
sequence of non-locality of the mind. Heisenberg noted:
”Since through the observation our knowledge of the sys-
tem has changed discontinuously, its mathematical rep-
resentation also has undergone the discontinuous change
and we speak of a ’quantum jump’” [31]. He justified the
’quantum jump’ with help of the fact that ”our knowl-
edge can change suddenly” [31], i.e. the obvious fact that
the knowledge of Alice, for example, changes at the in-
fluence of the object, the deflection of the particle, on
the subject, her mind. Already before the observation
the Alice knowledge about the probability of the deflec-
tion up or down of particles A and B is entangled. She
knows that if the deflection of one particle, for exam-
ple A, will be up than the deflection of other particle B
should be down. Thus, the EPR correlation (4) describes
the entanglement of the Alice knowledge about the spin
state of two particles. Therefore, motivated [32] by EPR
[24], Schrodinger coined [33, 33] the term ”entanglement
of our knowledge”: ”Maximal knowledge of a total sys-
tem does not necessarily include total knowledge of all
its parts, not even when these are fully separated from
each other and at the moment are not influencing each
other at all”. Maximal knowledge of a total system in-
clude total knowledge of all its parts in the case (3) when
γ1γ4 = γ2γ3 but not in the case (4) when γ1γ4 6= γ2γ3.
In his last talk [35] Bell considered the question: ”What
can not go faster than light?” He said: ”The situation is
further complicated by the fact that there are things which
do go faster than light. British sovereignty is the clas-
sical example. When the Queen dies in London (may it
long be delayed) the Prince of Wales, lecturing on modern
architecture in Australia, becomes instantaneously King,
(Greenwich Mean Time rules here)” [35]. There is im-
portant to define more exactly that the Prince of Wales
becomes instantaneously King in the mind of witnesses of
the Queen death. Like manner the spin state of the dis-
tant particle B changes instantaneously from (4) to (5a)
in the mind of Alice when she sees that her particle A has
deflected up. The analogue of the British sovereignty in
the EPR correlation is the Dirac jump, or wave function
collapse, which should be at the Process 1. But there
is a fundamental difference of the Dirac jump from the
British sovereignty. The witnesses of the Queen death
cannot have an influence on the Prince of Wales whereas
Alice can govern the spin state of the distant particle B.
Each of the eigenstates (5a) and (5b) of the operator of
the spin component along n (this dynamical variable) is
superposition of eigenstates of the spin component along
other direction (other dynamical variable) [19]. Suppose
that initially Alice had chosen to orient the non-uniform
magnetic field of her Stern-Gerlach analyzer perpendic-
ular to the line of flight of the approaching particle, the
y-axis, and pointing vertically upward along the z-axis.
And Bob had oriented his non-uniform magnetic field
also perpendicular to the y-axis but at an angle ϕ to the
z-axis. Than the EPR pair jumps discontinuously to the
6state
ψz = | ↑A,z↓B,z>= cos(ϕ/2)| ↑A,ϕ↓B,ϕ> +
+sin(ϕ/2)| ↓A,ϕ↑B,ϕ> (6a)
when Alice will see that her particle has deflected up and
to the state
ψz = | ↓A,z↑B,z>= −sin(ϕ/2)| ↑A,ϕ↓B,ϕ> +
+cos(ϕ/2)| ↓A,ϕ↑B,ϕ> (6b)
when her particle has deflected down. The operator of
the turning round the y-axis [19] is used hear and below.
Each of these states is the eigenstate of the operator cor-
responding to the orientation on the Alice analyzer but
it is superposition the eigenstates of the operator corre-
sponding to the orientation on the Bob analyzer. Alice
can turn her Stern-Gerlach analyzer on an angle θ during
the flight of the particles of the EPR pair (4). This turn
changes the spin states of both her and Bob’s particle
after her observation to
ψθ = | ↑A,θ↓B,θ>= cos((ϕ− θ)/2)| ↑A,ϕ↓B,ϕ> +
+sin((ϕ− θ)/2)| ↓A,ϕ↑B,ϕ> (7a)
if her particle has deflected up and to
ψθ = | ↓A,θ↑B,θ>= −sin((ϕ− θ)/2)| ↑A,ϕ↓B,ϕ> +
+cos((ϕ− θ)/2)| ↓A,ϕ↑B,ϕ> (7b)
if it has deflected down. Thus, the EPR correlation re-
veals that quantum mechanics concedes that Alice can
change instantaneously the quantum state of the distant
particle with her will and her observation. According to
the Born’s interpretation she can act faster than light
thanks to non-locality of her mind.
2.3. Violation of Bell’s inequalities uncovers the
influence of subject on object
Heisenberg justified [31] the discontinuous change con-
ceded quantum mechanics with the argument that our
knowledge of the system changes discontinuously at any
observation. But quantum mechanics represents not only
our knowledge. It predicts first of all the probability of
different outcomes of observations. For example, the re-
lation (7) predicts that the probability to observe the de-
flection up of the Bob’s particle equals |cos((ϕ − θ)/2)|2
and down |sin((ϕ − θ)/2)|2 when the Alice particle has
deflected up. Thus, the Alice’s will and her observation
influence instantaneously on the outcome of observations
of the distant particle. This influence is revealed most
FIG. 2: Sketch of the EPR experiment (a) and experimental
apparatus for measurement of the probability Pθ+Pϕ− with
help of a source of single electrons Se (b). In a case (a) one
of the electrons of each EPR pair flies from the EPR pairs
source SEPR to the Stern-Gerlach analyzer A, and another to
the analyzer B. The probabilities PAθ+ = NA+/(NA++NA−)
and PBϕ+ = NB+/(NB+ +NB−) are defined as the relation
of number NA+ (or NB+) of detection by detector DA+ (or
DB+) to the sum NA+ +NA− (or NB+ +NB−) of detection
by detectors DA+ and DA− (or DB+ and DB−). In a case
(b) electron flies from the source Se to the first Stern-Gerlach
analyzer and gets in the second analyzer if it deflects up, and
gets in the first detector D1− if it deflects down. After the
second analyzer electron gets in the detectorD2+ orD2−. The
probability Pθ+Pϕ− = N2−/(N1− +N2+ +N2−) is defined as
the relation of the number N2− of detection by detector D2+
to the sum N1− +N2+ +N2− of detection by all detectors
definitely with help of the Bell’s inequalities [36]. Only
condition used at the deduction of the Bell’s inequality
is ”the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the
result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by
operations on a distant system” [36]. Bell had proposed
in [27] a most simple example of this logical deduction.
Bell started with an trivial inequality
P0+P45− + P45+P90− ≥ P0+P90− (8a)
asserting that the probability P0+ of the deflection up at
the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer vertically
upward along the z-axis, i.e. at θ = 0o and the P45−
of the deflection down at θ = 45o plus the probability
P45+ of the deflection up at θ = 45
o and P90− - down
at θ = 90o is not less than the probability P0+ of the
deflection up at θ = 0o and P90− - down at θ = 90
o. The
inequality is obvious when all probabilities P0+, P45−,
P45+ and P90− are measured in the same spin state.
Any particle in the same spin state which deflects up at
θ = 0o and down at θ = 90o (and so contributing to the
third probability P0+P90− in (8a)) can deflect either up
at θ = 45o (and so contributes to the second probability
P45+P90− in (8a)) or down at θ = 45
o (and so contributes
to the first probability P0+P45− in (8a)). The inequality
7is trivial but it can not be verified experimentally with
measurements of single particles, as shown on Fig2b, be-
cause ”· · · a measurement always causes the system to
jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is
being measured” [29]. All particles flying from the first
to the second Stern-Gerlach analyzer on Fig.2b should
be in the state ’spin up’ because of this Dirac jump. The
eigenstate ’spin up’ for this orientation of the first Stern-
Gerlach analyzer differs in common case from the initial
spin state of the particles. Therefore it is impossible to
measure the probabilities both P0+ and P45−, for ex-
ample, in the same spin state with the method shown
on Fig.2b. The probabilities at different orientation of
the Stern-Gerlach analyzers θ and ϕ can be measured in
the same state with help of the EPR pair if the require-
ment of locality is valid. The equality of the probabilities
PAθ+ = PBθ− and PAθ− = PBθ+ must be observed be-
cause of the EPR correlation when if one particle A of
the EPR pairs (4) deflects up then the other B always
deflects down and vice-versa. This equality is valid for
all orientation including θ = 45o and θ = 90o. The Bell’s
inequality
PA0+PB45+ + PA45+PB90+ ≥ PA0+PB90+ (8b)
is deduced from the obvious inequality (8a) at the sin-
gle requirement: a turning of the Stern-Gerlach ana-
lyzer A located in a space region rA can not change in-
stantaneously on the spin of the distant particle B lo-
cated in a space region rB and vice-versa. The proba-
bility to observe the deflection up in the Stern-Gerlach
analyzers A equals always the same value PAθ+ =
(|γ2|
2 + |γ3|
2)/2 = 0.5 if Alice is first observer because
of the same probability for each particle of the EPR
pair (4) to flow toward Alice. Bob, as second observer,
should observe the deflection up with the probability
PBϕ+ = |sin((ϕ − θ)/2)|
2 according to (7a). The re-
sult PAθ+PBϕ+ = 0.5|sin((ϕ − θ)/2)|
2 gives the values
PA0+PB45+ = PA45+PB90+ = 0.5sin
2(45o/2) ≈ 0.0732,
PA0+PB90+ = 0.5sin
2(90o/2) ≈ 0.25. The inequality
(8b) would then require
0.1464 ≥ 0.25 (8c)
which is not true.
This violation (8c) of the Bell’s inequality (8b) reveals
that quantum mechanics presupposes that a turning of
the Stern-Gerlach analyzer can influence instantaneously
on the distant particle because the Bell’s inequality (8b)
was deduced only from the requirement of impossibility of
such non-local influence. According to the Born’s inter-
pretation this non-local influence is actualized by means
of the Alice’s mind. The probability that the Bob’s par-
ticle will deflect up should equal PBϕ+ = 0.5 until Alice
has seen that her particle has deflected up. Thus the
probability of the observation ’spin up’ by Bob changes
from PBϕ+ = 0.5 to PBϕ+ = |sin((ϕ−θ)/2)|
2 because of
the discontinuous change of the Alice’s knowledge. The
knowledge changes because of the influence of object on
subject and the probability of the observation changes
because of the influence of subject on object. Thus,
the EPR correlation and the Bell’s inequalities have con-
firmed the statement by Schrodinger that in the orthodox
quantum mechanics ”· · · the causal interconnection be-
tween the subject and object is considered reciprocal. It is
stated, that the unremovable and uncontrollable influence
of the subject on the object takes place” [21].
2.4. What EPR intended to prove and what they
have proved
EPR [24] denied any possibility of the EPR correla-
tion. It was in conflict with the Einstein’s belief: ”But
on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely
hold fast: the real factual situation of the system S2 is
independent of what is done with the system S1, which is
spatially separated from the former” [37]. EPR intended
to prove ”that the description of reality as given by a
wave function is not complete” [24]. Of course they had
in mind the wave function in the Born’s interpretation.
It is stated in the abstract of the EPR paper [24]: ”In
quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities
described by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of
one precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either
(1) the description of reality given by the wave function
in QM is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannot
have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem
of making predictions concerning a system on the basis
of measurements made on another system that had pre-
viously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1)
is false then (2) is also false”. Indeed, if Alice reveals
a real situation existing irrespective of any act of obser-
vation when she sees that the particle has deflected up
in her Stern-Gerlach analyzer pointing vertically upward
along the z-axis (6a) than all other spin components (7a)
or (7b) of her and Bob’s particles should exist before her
observation. Alice can know any spin component (7a)
or (7b) in the same spine state turning her analyzer in
the respective axis. Therefore she can obtain the knowl-
edge about different spin component of the Bob’s par-
ticle, | ↓B,z> and | ↓B,θ> for example, contrary to the
foundation of QM, if this knowledge about a real situa-
tion existing irrespective of her mind.
Thus, QM is observably inadequate if it is interpreted
as the description of reality. The description given by the
wave function in QM can be adequate and complete only
if two physical quantities described by non-commuting
operators does not have reality simultaneous before their
observation. QM can be valid only if physical quantities
are rather created by the mind of the observer than mea-
sured at the observation. Just this absurdity of QM had
been proved by EPR [24]. Bell proposed ”to replace the
word ’measurement’” which misleads: ”When it is said
that something is ’measured’ it is difficult not to think
of the result as referring to some pre-existing property
of the object in question” [24]. The pre-existing prop-
8erties revealed at measurement are in hidden-variables
theory, alternative the orthodox QM using the Born’s in-
terpretation. According to this theory, hidden variables
determine results of individual measurements and thus
eliminate subjectivity and indeterminism inherent QM.
2.5. Hidden variable
Bell asserted ”that vagueness, subjectivity, and inde-
terminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts,
but by deliberate theoretical choice” [38]. It is not ab-
solutely so. The main reason of refusal of realism were
problems with the realistic description of some quantum
phenomena, such as Stern-Gerlach effect [39]. Bohr wrote
in 1949 [40], that ”as exposed so clearly by Einstein and
Ehrenfest [41], it presented with unsurmountable difficul-
ties any attempt at forming a picture of the behaviour of
atoms in a magnetic field”. And Bell wrote 32 years later:
”Phenomena of this kind made physicists despair of find-
ing any consistent space-time picture of what goes on the
atomic and subatomic scale · · · Going further still, some
asserted that atomic and subatomic particles do not have
any definite properties in advance of observation. There
is nothing, that is to say, in the particles approaching
the magnet, to distinguish those subsequently deflected up
from those subsequently deflected down. Indeed even the
particles are not really there” [27].
As Bell wrote [42] ”To know the quantum mechani-
cal state of a system implies, in general, only statistical
restrictions on the results of measurements”. The clas-
sical statistical mechanics also describes only statistical
distribution of parameters. But these parameters are as-
sumed to exist irrespective of any act of observation and
the mind of the observer. Just the negation of real ex-
istence of parameters results to subjectivity and indeter-
minism of QM. Therefore Bell was sure: ”It seems inter-
esting to ask if this statistical element be thought of as
arising, as in classical statistical mechanics, because the
states in question are averages over better defined states
for which individually the results would be quite deter-
mined. These hypothetical ’dispersion free’ states would
be specified not only by the quantum mechanical state vec-
tor but also by additional ’hidden variables’-’hidden’ be-
cause if states with prescribed values of these variables
could actually be prepared, quantum mechanics would be
observably inadequate” [42]. But most physicists did not
take an interest in this problem fifty years ago and up to
now many physicists underestimate the fundamental im-
portance of hidden variables. Few experts, who did find
the question interesting, believed that ”the question con-
cerning the existence of such hidden variables received an
early and rather decisive answer in the form of von Neu-
mann’s proof on the mathematical impossibility of such
variables in quantum theory” [42].
But this belief was false. David Mermin writes in
the paper ”Hidden variables and the two theorems of
John Bell” [43]: ”A third of a century passed before John
Bell, 1966, rediscovered the fact that von Neumann’s no-
variables-hidden proof was based on an assumption that
can only be described as silly - so silly, in fact, that one is
led to wonder whether the proof was ever studied by either
the students or those who appealed to it”. Von Neumann
did not take into account that non-commuting opera-
tors do not have simultaneous eigenvalues [43]. There is
more important to realize a physical mistake correspond-
ing to this ’mathematical’ mistake. Eigenvalues non-
commuting operators cannot be simultaneous measured
according to the quantum postulate and complementar-
ity proposed by Bohr [23]. Bell noted [42] that additional
demands of the von Neumann’s proof are ”quite unrea-
sonable when one remembers with Bohr [40] ’the impos-
sibility of any sharp distinction between the behaviour
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measur-
ing instruments which serve to define the conditions un-
der which the phenomena appear’”. In order to exhibit
of the error of the von Neumann’s proof Bell had con-
structed a hidden-variables model which reproduces all
predictions of results of a single spin 1/2 measurement
given by QM. There is important to accentuate that Bell
used in this model the Bohr’s quantum postulate which
”implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will
involve an interaction with the agency of observation not
to be neglected” [23]. According to the quantum postu-
late ”With or without hidden variables the analysis of the
measurement process presents peculiar difficulties” [42],
because no theory can describe an interaction with the
agency of observation. Any result of this interaction may
be assumed because of this vagueness.
In the Bell’s model [42] the interaction of single spin
1/2 with the agency of observation results to mea-
surement of the same value of spin component, as
it is observed in the paradoxical Stern-Gerlach effect
[39]. Thanks to the vague interaction the results of
observation can be described with the relation sn =
1/2cos(θ)/|cos(θ)| proposed by Bell in [27]. This rela-
tion describes an individual measurement of spin com-
ponent sn along n, as well as the superposition (3), but
has a fundamental advantage: θ is the angle between an
axis n of Stern-Gerlach analyzer and an axis z +m of
spin. Therefore results of an individual measurement is
determined with the spin axis z+m and the mind of the
observer can not influence on these results. In the Bell’s
model [42] z is a unit vector directed along the z-axis in
the spin state ψz = | ↑z> and m is a random unit vec-
tor which plays the role of hidden variable. This model
predicts the same probabilities of observation of positive
values Pθ+ = 1/2+
∫ pi/2
θ dx2pi sinx/4pi = (1 + cos θ)/2 =
cos2(θ/2) and negative values Pθ− =
∫ θ
0
dx2pi sinx/4pi =
(1− cos θ)/2 = sin2(θ/2) as orthodox QM.
It predicts also that if one particle A of the EPR pair
goes up the other B always goes down and vice-versa
when axis of two analyzers is directed in the same di-
rection n because if cos(θA) > 0 for the angle θA be-
tween n and +(z + m) then cos(θB) < 0 for the an-
9gle θB between n and −(z + m) and vice-versa. The
hidden-variables model implies also the Dirac jump at
observation in order to correspond to the prediction of
QM. Therefore it also predicts violation of the trivial in-
equality (8a). Because of the vague interaction with the
agency of observation, i.e. with the first Stern-Gerlach
analyzer, shown on Fig.2b, the particle deflecting with
the probability Pθ+ = 0.5 to the second Stern-Gerlach
analyzer jumps to the spin state ψθ = | ↑θ>. Therefore
the particle will deflect down after the second analyzer
with the probability Pϕ− = |sin((ϕ − θ)/2)|
2. The total
probability Pθ+Pϕ− = 0.5|sin((ϕ− θ)/2)|
2 to hit the de-
tectorD2− predicts violation (8c) of the trivial inequality
(8a): P0+P45− = P45+P90− = 0.5sin
2(45o/2) ≈ 0.0732,
P0+P90− = 0.5sin
2(90o/2) ≈ 0.25. Thus, the hidden-
variables model can reproduce almost all prediction of
QM. Among few predictions which it can not reproduce
is violation of the Bell’s inequality (8b). The probability
of observation both sn = +1/2 and sn = −1/2 of each
particle of the EPR pairs is the same PAθ+ = PAθ− =
PBϕ+ = PBϕ− = 0.5 because the results of individual
measurements are determined by the spin axis +(z+m)
or −(z+m) and therefore the act of measurement of one
particle can not influence on the result of observation of
other particle. The corroboration of the Bell’s inequality
(8b) PA0+PB45++PA45+PB90+ = 0.5× 0.5+ 0.5× 0.5 =
0.5 > PA0+PB90+ = 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25 reveals that if
definite properties exist in advance of observation then
’measurement’ might be complete without the mind of
the observer.
There is important to note that hidden variables re-
place the mind of the observer with soulless agencies of
observation. This fact reveals that the quantum postu-
late and complementarity proposed by Bohr [23] is valid
according to rather hidden-variables theories than the
QM based on the Born’s interpretation. Variables are
hidden just because ”any observation of atomic phenom-
ena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-
vation not to be neglected” [23]. Bohr concluded from
this statement implied with his quantum postulate that
”an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies
of observation” [23]. This conclusion misleads. A cel-
ebrated polymath who is quoted in [43] declared that
”Most theoretical physicists are guilty of · · · fail[ing] to
distinguish between a measurable indeterminacy and the
epistemic indeterminability of what is in reality deter-
minate. The indeterminacy discovered by physical mea-
surements of subatomic phenomena simply tells us that
we cannot know the definite position and velocity of an
electron at any instant of time. It does not tell as that
the electron, at any instant of time, does not have a def-
inite position and velocity. [Physicists] · · · convert what
is not measurable by them into the unreal and the non-
existent” [44]. Bohr was among these most theoretical
physicists and had misled some generation of physicists
with his quantum postulate and complementarity. He
did not take into account that an interaction with the
agency of observation can change variables at observation
but it can not create observed variables. Only the mind
of the observer can create definite properties observed by
the observer if they were not definite with variables even
hidden in advance of observation. The EPR correlation
and violation (8c) of the Bell’s inequality (8b) reveal that
an interaction rather with the mind of the observer than
with the agency of observation is implied in the orthodox
QM thanks to the non-locality of the first interaction and
the locality of the second one.
2.6. Indeterminism of quantum mechanics. The
entanglement of cat with atom states
Von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner and also Heisenberg and
others were forced to note ”that ’measurement’ might be
complete only in the mind of the observer” [24] because
of indeterminism of QM: if a cause of a definite result of
the observation is absent in nature then only the mind of
the observer can be the cause. Bohr reminder in 1949 [40]
that during the Solvay meeting 1927 ”interesting discus-
sion arose also about how to speak of the appearance of
phenomena for which only predictions of statistical char-
acter can be made. The question was whether, as to the
occurrence of individual effects, we should adopt a termi-
nology proposed by Dirac, that we were concerned with a
choice on the part of ”nature” or, as suggested by Heisen-
berg, we should say that we have to do with a choice on the
part of the ’observer’ constructing the measuring instru-
ments and reading their recording”. Bohr wrote: ”Any
such terminology would, however, appear dubious since,
on the one hand, it is hardly reasonable to endow nature
with volition in the ordinary sense, while, on the other
hand, it is certainly not possible for the observer to influ-
ence the events which may appear under the conditions he
has arranged” and advertised his complementarity: ”To
my mind, there is no other alternative than to admit that,
in this field of experience, we are dealing with individ-
ual phenomena and that our possibilities of handling the
measuring instruments allow us only to make a choice
between the different complementary types of phenomena
we want to study” [40]. But this pet idea by Bohr can
not answer on the question: ”What or who can a defi-
nite result of the observation determine?” It can result
and even had resulted [19] to the illusion that individual
effects are chosen by the agency of observation, named
”the ’classical object’ usually called apparatus” [19].
This illusion is logically absurd. Nevertheless it pre-
dominated and predominates up to now among most
physicists thanks to the followers [19] of Bohr. Bell had
called the spontaneous jump of a ’classical’ apparatus
into an eigenstate of its ’reading’ as the LL jump, con-
sidering in [24] Quantum Mechanics by L D Landau and
E M Lifshitz [19] as the first of the ’good books’ which
mislead. The assumption [19] about the LL jump is ab-
surd first of all because a apparatus even ’classical’ is
a part of nature as well as the cat in the famous para-
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dox proposed by Schrodinger [33]. The Schrodinger’s cat
paradox is well-known but pure understood. Therefore
it is useful to reminder its text here: ”One can even
set up quite ridiculous cases. A cat is penned up in a
steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device
(which must be secured against direct interference by the
cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive
substance, so small that perhaps in the course of one hour
one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability,
perhaps none; if it hap-pens, the [Geiger] counter tube
discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which
shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left
this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say
that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed.
The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. The ψ-
function of the entire system would express this by having
in it the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression)
mixed or smeared out in equal parts” [33], see also p.185
in the book [16]. Schrodinger had entangled with the
ψ-function of the entire system
Ψcat = αAtdecayGyesFlyesCatdead+
+βAtnoGnoFlnoCatliving (9)
cat state Catdead, Catliving with the states of the small
flask of hydrocyanic acid Flyes, Flno, the Geiger counter
tube Gyes, Gyes and radioactive atom Atdecay, Atno with
the experiment conditions. The act of observation of the
dead cat is described with the ψ - function (9) collapse
to
Ψcat = AtdecayGyesFlyesCatdead (10)
One can draw the conclusion that the cat is dead Catdead
because the hammer has shattered the small flask of hy-
drocyanic acid Flyes. The hammer has shattered it be-
cause the Geiger counter tube has discharged Gyes. It
is has discharged because the atom has decayed Atdecay.
Till this each event had a cause. But the atom decay
is causless. There is no term to the right of Atdecay in
(9). According to the assumption [19] about the LL jump
the cat kills himself. Moreover one may demonstrate to
combine two famous paradoxes, the EPR paradox and
the Schrodinger’s cat paradox, that the death of a cat
A can preserve life of a distant cat B and vice-versa.
Thereto one may substitute of the radioactive atom for
the EPR pairs with two spin particles in the singlet state
(4), as well as in the Bohm’s version [28] of the EPR
paradox. We will use also two Stern-Gerlach analysers,
two Geiger counter tubes, two flasks of hydrocyanic acid
and two cats CatA and CatB. The Geiger counter tubes
will be located on the upper trajectory of each particle
after its exit from its Stern-Gerlach analyser, so it will
discharge when spin up and will not discharge when spin
down. The subsequent events will be as well as in the
Schrodinger paradox [33]. This gedankenexperiment can
be described with the ψ-function
ΨEPR,cat = γ2| ↑A (rA) ↓B (rB) > CatA,deadCatB,liv+
+γ3| ↓A (rA) ↑B (rB) > CatA,livCatB,dead (11)
with two types of entanglements: because of the con-
servation law (the EPR correlation) and because of the
condition of experiment proposed by Schrodinger [33].
The results of observations will be
ΨEPR,cat = CatA,deadCatB,liv (12a)
or
ΨEPR,cat = CatA,livCatB,dead (12b)
when the axis of the Stern-Gerlach analysers are paral-
lel. Advocates of quantum mechanics justify the using of
state superposition (11) with the absence of any cause of
the atom decay. They ”convert what is not measurable
by them into the unreal and the non-existent” [44]. Let
imagine that we do not know why the observed states of
cats are correlated as well as we do not know the cause of
atom decay. Then, to convert our lack of knowledge into
the unreal we can describe the results of our observations
of the cats state with superposition
ΨEPR,cat = γ2CatA,deadCatB,liv + γ3CatA,livCatB,dead
(13)
which should collapse to (12a) or (12b) at each obser-
vation. The absence of any cause of (12a) or (12b) in
advance of observation raises a question: ”What or who
makes a choice?” According to the concept of the spon-
taneous collapse of a macroscopic system into a definite
macroscopic configuration [19], i.e. the LL jump [24],
the choice is made by a cat, which is a ’classical’ appara-
tus in the Schrodinger’s paradox. But what cat A or B
would make a choice (12a) or (12b)? The collapse of the
superposition of cats states (13) must be instantaneous
irrespective of a distance |rA−rB| between cats. Accord-
ing to the principle of relativity by Einstein both the cat
A and the cat B may be observed first in the same case
but in different frames of reference. Therefore it is im-
possible to say the spontaneous collapse of what cat can
choose the fate of other cat with help a mystical action
of a distance. The absurdity of the LL jump assumed in
[19] is obvious even without this consideration of the cats
fate. It must be obvious for any one that only a magical
apparatus even ’classical’ can collapse spontaneously.
2.7. Whose knowledge and whose will?
Therefore von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner, Heisenberg
and others admitted ”that ’measurement’ might be com-
plete only in the mind of the observer” and the Dirac
jump is forced by an external intervention [24] which can
be only the mind of the observer. But a choice on the
part of the ’observer’ suggested by Heisenberg can not
deliver from a logical absurdity. According to the basic
principle of QM formulated by Dirac ”· · · a measurement
always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of
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the dynamical variable that is being measured” [29]. But
into which eigenstate should the system jump when two
dynamical variables described by non-commuting oper-
ators are measured at the same time? Alice may orient
her Stern-Gerlach analyser at an angle θ to the z-axis and
Bob may orient his Stern-Gerlach analyser at an other
angle ϕ. Then Alice will be sure that her and Bob’s par-
ticles jump to the spin state (7a) when she will see that
her particle has deflected up. But Bob will be sure that
his and Alice’s particles jump to the other state
ψϕ = | ↓A,ϕ↑B,ϕ>= −sin((θ − ϕ)/2)| ↑A,θ↓B,θ> +
+cos((θ − ϕ)/2)| ↓A,θ↑B,θ> (14)
when he will see that his particle has deflected up. Thus,
according to orthodox QM, knowledge of two observers
of the same system can be various. Moreover, each of
them can impose her (or his) will on the distant particle.
When Alice has oriented her Stern-Gerlach along the z-
axis the Bob’s particle should jump in the spin state (5a)
or (5b) at her measurement. And when Bob has oriented
his Stern-Gerlach at an angle θ to the z-axis the Alice’s
particle should jump in the spin state (6a) or (6b) at
his measurement. Here it is impossible to solve, whose
knowledge is correct, and whose will can win because of
the principle of relativity according to which Alice ob-
serves her particle ahead of Bob in a frame of reference
whereas in an other frame of reference Bob observes his
particle ahead of Alice.
This absurdity of QM has became especially relevant
after experimental evidence [45–47] of violation of the
Bell’s inequalities. Before these experiments Bell ex-
pressed a hope that ”Perhaps Nature is not so queer as
quantum mechanics” [27] and rated a possibility of vio-
lation of his inequalities as indigestible. One of the in-
terpretations of this violation could be a conclusion that
”Apparently separate parts of the world would be deeply
and conspiratorially entangled, and our apparent free will
would be entangled with them” [27]. The results of the
experiments of the Aspect’s team [45–47] Bell appraised
as a fundamental problem of theory: ”For me then this
is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently
essential conflict between any sharp formulation and fun-
damental relativity. That is to say, we have an apparent
incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fun-
damental pillars of contemporary theory” p. 172 in [1].
As opposed to Bell contemporary believers in the sooth-
ing philosophy or religion of Heisenberg-Bohr, for exam-
ple the authors of the book [48] are sure that violation of
the Bell’s inequalities has corroborated the correctness
of QM. Mermin wrote as far back as in 1985 [49]: ”In
the question of whether there is some fundamental prob-
lem with quantum mechanics signaled by tests of Bell’s
inequality, physicists can be divided into a majority who
are ’indifferent’ and a minority who are ’bothered’”.
This division observed up to now witnesses against
QM as a consistent and transparent theory. The incon-
sistency the assessment discloses vagueness of QM. The
majority who are ’indifferent’ rather believe than under-
stand QM. The authors of the book [48] and other be-
lievers do not want to understand that no experimental
result can save QM because it is self-contradictory and
vague. Because of its vagueness the contradictions were
observed even between its creators, Heisenberg and Bohr,
first of all about the role of the observer. Heisenberg ad-
mitted that ’measurement’ might be complete only in
the mind of the observer. It is obvious, for example,
from his destructive criticism of Soviet scientists Alexan-
drov and Blochinzev in the Section VIII ”Criticism and
Counterproposals to the Copenhagen Interpretation of
Quantum Theory” of the Lectures 1955-1956 ”Physics
and Philosophy” [31]. These Soviet scientists stated that
”Among the different idealistic trends of contemporary
physics the so-called Copenhagen school is the most re-
actionary” [31] and rejected the role of the observer in
QM. Heisenberg quotes Alexandrov ”We must therefore
understand by ’result of measurement’ in quantum theory
only the objective effect of the interaction of the electron
with a suitable object. Mention of the observer must be
avoided, and we must treat objective conditions and ob-
jective and effects. A physical quantity is objective char-
acteristic of phenomenon, but not the result of an ob-
servation” and notes ”According to Alexandrov, the wave
function in configuration space characterizes the objective
state of the electron” [31]. Further Heisenberg explains
why the Alexandrov’s point of view is false: ”In his pre-
sentation Alexandrov overlooks the fact that the formal-
ism of quantum theory does not allow the same degree of
objectivation as that of classical physics. For instance,
if a interaction of a system with the measuring appara-
tus is treated as a whole according to QM and if both are
regarded as cut off from the rest of the world, then the
formalism of quantum theory does not as a rule lead to
a define result; it will not lead, e.g., to the blackening of
the photographic plate in a given point. If one tries to
rescue the Alexandrov’s ’objective effect’ by saying that
’in reality’ the plate is blackened at a given point after
the interaction, the rejoinder is the quantum mechani-
cal treatment of the closed system consisting of electron,
measuring apparatus and plate is no longer being applied”
[31].
This disproof by Heisenberg of the objectivation of QM
is doubtless. Its obviousness is illustrated in the Section
2.1 and must be quite clear at consideration of the exam-
ple shown on Fig.1: the wave-packet can be compacted
only by the mind of the observer. In spite of this ob-
viousness not only the Soviet scientists Alexandrov and
Blochinzev but most physicists including Bohr objectified
and objectify the matter of quantum mechanical treat-
ment. Bohr objectified it with his quantum postulate and
complementarity [23] according to which the act of obser-
vation is an interaction with the agency of observation.
Most physicists had followed rather Bohr than Heisen-
berg because of their robust common sense according to
which both the many world interpretation and the mind
of the observer are mind-boggling fantasies. QM seems
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reasonable to most physicists only thanks to its misinter-
pretation. The following word by Heisenberg can explain
partly the cause of this mass delusion: ”Above all, we see
from these formulations how difficult it is when we try to
push new ideas into an old system of concepts belonging
to an earlier philosophy - or, to use an old metaphor,
when we attempt to put new wine into old bottles” [31].
Therefore it is needed to give an account of the essence
of a new bottle proposed by Heisenberg for QM.
3. NEW WELTANSCHAUUNG PROPOSED BY
HEISENBERG
QM had originated from the proposal by young Heisen-
berg ”to try to establish a theoretical quantum mechanics,
analogous classical mechanics, but in which only relations
between observable quantities occur” [2]. Only few scien-
tists, first of all Einstein, realized at that time and later
on that this proposal presupposes a revolutionary revi-
sion of the aim of science and even a new Weltanschau-
ung. The essence of this revolutionary revision was ex-
pressed by Einstein in his explanation of ”reasons which
keep he from falling in line with the opinion of almost
all contemporary theoretical physicists”: ”What does not
satisfy me in that theory, from the standpoint of prin-
ciple, is its attitude towards that which appears to me
to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete
description of any (individual) real situation (as it sup-
posedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or
substantiation)” [50]. The philosophical fundamentals of
QM, proclaimed by Heisenberg as far back as 1927 are:
subjectivity, ”I believe that one can fruitfully formulate
the origin of the classical ’orbit’ in this way: the ’orbit’
comes into being only when we observe it” [22]; the nega-
tion of an objective reality, ”As the statistical character
of quantum theory is so closely linked to the inexactness
of all perceptions, one might be led to the presumption
that behind the perceived statistical world there still hides
a ’real’ world in which causality holds. But such specula-
tions seem to us, to say it explicitly, fruitless and sense-
less. Physics ought to describe only the correlation of
observations” [22]; indeterminism, ”One can express the
true state of affairs better in this way: Because all ex-
periments are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics,
and therefore to equation (1), it follows that quantum
mechanics establishes the final failure of causality” [22].
The equation (1) in [22] is the famous Heisenberg’s un-
certainty relation. Thus, the uncertainty principle results
to indeterminism, according to its author.
3.1. Quantum mechanics rejects the Cartesian
polarity between ’res cogitans’ and ’res extensa’
Later on Heisenberg had developed his new Weltan-
schauung more neatly, in particular in his Lectures 1955-
1956 ”Physics and Philosophy” [31]. In the beginning of
the Section V ”The Development of Philosophical Ideas
Since Descartes in Comparison with the New Situation
in Quantum Theory” he stated: ”This reality was full of
life and there was no good reason to stress the distinc-
tion between matter and mind or between body and soul”
[31]. This point of view by Heisenberg contradicts funda-
mentally to the scientific Weltanschauung of the previous
centuries and Heisenberg emphasizes that QM compels
to change this Weltanschauung. He reminds: ”The first
great philosopher of this new period of science was Rene
Descartes who lived in the first half of the seventeenth
century. Those of his ideas that are most important for
the development of scientific thinking are contained in his
Discourse on Method” [31]. And then Heisenberg points
out on the importance of the Cartesian philosophy for
the posterior development of natural science: ”While an-
cient Greek philosophy had tried to find order in the in-
finite variety of things and events by looking for some
fundamental unifying principle, Descartes tries to estab-
lish the order through some fundamental division · · · If
one uses the fundamental concepts of Descartes at all, it
is essential that God is in the world and in the I and it is
also essential that the I cannot be really separated from
the world. Of course Descartes knew the undisputable
necessity of the connection, but philosophy and natural
science in the following period developed on the basis of
the polarity between the ’res cogitans’ and the ’res ex-
tensa’, and natural science concentrated its interest on
the ’res extensa’. The influence of the Cartesian division
on human thought in the following centuries can hardly
be overestimated, but it is just this division which we have
to criticise later from the development of physics in our
time” [31].
The latter sentence clarifies in a greatest extent the
fundamental difference of QM from all other theories of
physics. All other theories concentrated their interest on
the ’res extensa’, i.e. all objects of the Nature, existing
irrespective of any act of observation and the mind of the
observer, i.e. the ’res cogitans’. Heisenberg points out on
a philosophical basis of these theories ”Since · · · the ’res
cogitans’ and the ’res extensa’ were taken as completely
different in their essence, it did not seem possible that
they could act upon each other” [31]. He attacks this
basis ”Obviously this whole description is somewhat ar-
tificial and shows the grave defects of the Cartesian par-
tition” but admits ”On the other hand in natural science
the partition was for several centuries extremely success-
ful. The mechanics of Newton and all the other parts of
classical physics constructed after its model started from
the assumption that one can describe the world without
speaking about God or ourselves” [31]. Before the QM
emergence ”This possibility soon seemed almost a nec-
essary condition for natural science in general. But at
this point the situation changed to some extent through
quantum theory” [31]. Therefore Heisenberg comes ”to a
comparison of Descartes’s philosophical system with our
present situation in modern physics” [31].
His next remark demystifies the essence of his con-
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tradictions with Einstein and other critics of QM: ”If
one follows the great difficulty which even eminent sci-
entists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one
can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian par-
tition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the hu-
man mind during the three centuries following Descartes
and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really
different attitude toward the problem of reality” [31]. Ac-
cording to Heisenberg an old-fashioned attitude toward
the problem of reality may be called dogmatic realism
and metaphysical realism [31]. He explains the essence
of the first: ”Dogmatic realism claims that there are no
statements concerning the material world that cannot be
objectivated · · · actually the position of classical physics
is that of dogmatic realism. It is only through quantum
theory that we have learned that exact science is possible
without the basis of dogmatic realism. When Einstein has
criticised quantum theory he has done so from the basis of
dogmatic realism” [31]. Einstein said ”I like to think that
the moon is there even if I don’t look at it”, explaining his
dislike for QM. Heisenberg and Einstein did not agree but
they discussed on the common language of European phi-
losophy. Therefore this controversy of they makes quite
clear the essence of dogmatic realism. There is important
also to know the essence of metaphysical realism accord-
ing to Heisenberg: ”Metaphysical realism goes one step
further than dogmatic realism by saying that ’the things
really exist’. This is in fact what Descartes tried to prove
by the argument that ’God cannot have deceived us’” [31].
Heisenberg reminded above: ”On the basis of doubt and
logical reasoning he [Descartes] tries to find a completely
new and as he thinks solid ground for a philosophical sys-
tem. He does not accept revelation as such a basis nor
does he want to accept uncritically what is perceived by
the senses. So he starts with his method of doubt. He
casts his doubt upon that which our senses tell us about
the results of our reasoning and finally he arrives at his
famous sentence: ’cogito ergo sum’. I cannot doubt my
existence since it follows from the fact that I am think-
ing. After establishing the existence of the I in this way
he proceeds to prove the existence of God essentially on
the lines of scholastic philosophy. Finally the existence of
the world follows from the fact that God had given me a
strong inclination to believe in the existence of the world,
and it is simply impossible that God should have deceived
me” [31]. Soon after Descartes his faith that God can
not deceive was call in question by representatives for
early empiristic philosophy, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
According to Heisenberg: ”The criticism of metaphysical
realism which has been expressed in empiristic philosophy
is certainly justified in so far as it is a warning against
the naive use of the term ’existence’” [31].
3.2. The notion of the ’thing-in-itself ’ by Kant and
hidden-variables
According to the empiristic philosophy ”to be perceived
is identical with existence” [31]. Heisenberg admitted:
”This line of argument then was extended to an extreme
scepticism by Hume, who denied induction and causation
and thereby arrived at a conclusion which if taken se-
riously would destroy the basis of all empirical science”
[31] but he followed just this line when he rejected the
’thing-in-itself’ and the law of causality of the Kant’s
philosophy. Heisenberg wrote: ”The disagreeable ques-
tion whether ’the things really exist’, which had given
rise to empiristic philosophy, occurred also in Kant’s sys-
tem. But Kant has not followed the line of Berkeley and
Hume, though that would have been logically consistent.
He kept the notion of the ’thing-in-itself ’ as different from
the percept, and in this way kept some connection with
realism” [31]. He was right that ”Considering the Kan-
tian ’thing-in-itself ’ Kant had pointed out that we cannot
conclude anything from the perception about the ’thing-
in-itself ’” [31]. But his interpretation of the Kantian
’thing-in-itself’ is very doubt: ”This statement has, as
Weizsacker has noticed, its formal analogy in the fact
that in spite of the use of the classical concepts in all the
experiments a non-classical behaviour of the atomic ob-
jects is possible. The ’thing-in-itself ’ is for the atomic
physicist, if he uses this concept at all, finally a mathe-
matical structure: but this structure is - contrary to Kant
- indirectly deduced from experience” [31].
The Kantian ’thing-in-itself’ is rather a cause of our
perceptions than a mathematical structure. Any math-
ematical structure is a method of description and can-
not belong to the percept or the perception. It can
only describe they. Heisenberg and Weizsacker obscured
the obvious meaning of the Kantian ’thing-in-itself’ as a
cause of our perceptions because of their persuasion that
causality ”can have only a limited range of applicability”
[31]. They rejected the ’thing-in-itself’ as the cause of
our perceptions as well as they rejected hidden-variables
as the cause of an individual observation of quantum phe-
nomenon.
3.3. The Kantian a priori character of the law of
causality and quantum mechanics
The most doubt principle of QM and the new Weltan-
schauung by Heisenberg is indeterminism. Considering
the law of causality Heisenberg wrote: ”Kant says that
whenever we observe an event we assume that there is
a foregoing event from which the other event must fol-
low according to some rule. This is, as Kant states, the
basis of all scientific work. In this discussion it is not
important whether or not we can always find the forego-
ing event from which the other one followed. Actually we
can find it in many cases. But even if we cannot, noth-
ing can prevent us from asking what this foregoing event
14
might have been and to look for it. Therefore, the law of
causality is reduced to the method of scientific research;
it is the condition which makes science possible. Since
we actually apply this method, the law of causality is ’a
priori’ and is not derived from experience” [31]. If the
law of causality is the method of scientific research, as
Kant stated, then QM proposed by Heisenberg is obvi-
ously no-scientific theory. Heisenberg tried to prove that
”the scientific method actually changed in this very fun-
damental question since Kant” [31].
His first argument: ”We have been convinced by expe-
rience that the laws of quantum theory are correct and, if
they are, we know that a foregoing event as cause for the
emission at a given time cannot be found” [31]. The other
argument: ”We know the foregoing event, but not quite
accurately. We know the forces in the atomic nucleus that
are responsible for the emission of the α-particle. But
this knowledge contains the uncertainty which is brought
about by the interaction between the nucleus and the rest
of the world. If we wanted to know why the α-particle was
emitted at that particular time we would have to know the
microscopic structure of the whole world including our-
selves, and that is impossible” [31]. Both arguments are
doubt and have no relation to the fundamental question
about the law of causality. If this law is ’a priori’ and is
not derived from experience then its disproof can not be
also derived from experience. At least, the arguments by
Heisenberg could not satisfy Schrodinger, proposing the
cat paradox, Einstein and other critics of QM. Neverthe-
less Heisenberg stated that ”Kant’s arguments for the a
priori character of the law of causality no longer apply”
[31]. Most believers in the soothing philosophy or religion
of Heisenberg-Bohr overlook this philosophical statement
by Heisenberg.
4. FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES BY
SLEEPWALKERS
Most sleepwalkers stride unimpeded, first of all,
through the new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisen-
berg. Partly this carelessness may be explained with
the inconsistency of Heisenberg. In the same paper [22]
Heisenberg refutes a ’real’ world in which causality holds
and substantiates his uncertainty relation with help of
the famous ’uncertainty microscope’ existing in this real
world in which causality holds. Later on he criticises the
Cartesian polarity between the ’res cogitans’ and the ’res
extensa’ and notes: ”In classical physics science started
from the belief - or should one say from the illusion? -
that we could describe the world or at least parts of the
world without any reference to ourselves” [31]. On the
other hand he states that ”in the Copenhagen interpre-
tation of quantum theory we can indeed proceed without
mentioning ourselves as individuals” [31]. Then, what
is fundamental difference between the classical physics
and the Copenhagen interpretation? Heisenberg confuses
constantly the ’res cogitans’ and the ’res extensa’. For
example, disproving the claim by Alexandrov that ”Men-
tion of the observer must be avoided” (see above) Heisen-
berg writes: ”Of course the introduction of the observer
must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of
subjective features are to brought into the description of
nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of
registering decisions, i.e. processes in space and time,
and it does not matter whether the observer is an appa-
ratus or a human being · · ·” [31]. Any apparatus be-
longs to the ’res extensa’ whereas any human being is
the ’res cogitans’, at least according to Descartes. If
the observer is an apparatus then the Cartesian division
should not be criticised ”from the development of physics
in our time” [31] and Heisenberg rather follows than dis-
proves Alexandrov stating that ”’result of measurement’
in quantum theory only the objective effect of the interac-
tion of the electron with a suitable object”, see above. The
new Weltanschauung by Heisenberg could be unaccept-
able not only for most physicists but even for Heisenberg
himself if it would be logically consistent.
4.1. The quantum postulate and complementarity
proposed by Bohr ’objectivate’ observation
Heisenberg defines: ”The position to which the Carte-
sian partition has led with respect to the ’res extensa’
was what one may call metaphysical realism. The world,
i.e., the extended things, ’exist’” [31]. According to this
definition and the Cartesian division the dogmatic real-
ism claims that there are no statements concerning the
’res extensa’ that cannot be conceived outside of and in-
dependently of the ’res cogitans’. Therefore according
to Heisenberg the term ’to objectivate’ should signify to
conceive any real situation outside of and independently
of the mind of the observer. But he gives fundamentally
different definition: ”We ’objectivate’ a statement if we
claim that its content does not depend on the conditions
under which it can be verified” [31]. Heisenberg as well as
most theoretical physicists confuses here what is not mea-
surable with the unreal. Therefore his practical realism
is very vague. ”Practical realism assumes that there are
statements that can be objectivated and that in fact the
largest part of our experience in daily life consists of such
statements” [31]. If the term ’to objectivate’ signifies only
independence on the conditions of verification than the
Heisenberg’s practical realism can not make a distinc-
tion between the orthodox QM and theories of hidden
variables. This distinction can be made only with help
of the philosophically true definition of the term ’to ob-
jectivate’. We ’objectivate’ a statement if we claim that a
matter of its description (belonging to the ’res extensa’)
exists outside of and independently of the mind of the ob-
server (belonging to the ’res cogitans’). According to this
definition hidden variables can be objectivated whereas
the uncertainty relation, the superposition of states, the
Dirac jump and the act of observation in QM can not be
objectivated.
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But the true definition of the term ’to objectivate’ as
well as the true essence of QM of Heisenberg-Bohr could
be unacceptable for most physicists. Therefore QM based
on the quantum postulate and complementarity by Bohr
had became the symbol of almost general faith in spite
of its self-contradiction. Bohr had objectivated the act
of observation when he considered it as an interaction
between quantum system and measuring instrument. It
must be obvious that the Dirac jump can not be described
by this way. Nevertheless most physicists including such
eminent one as Feynman [13] and Landau [19] had fol-
lowed Bohr in his wrong belief. Bell wrote that ”Lan-
dau sat at the feet of Bohr” [24]. Therefore Landau was
sure ”that, in speaking of ’performing a measurement’,
we refer to the interaction of an electron with a classical
’apparatus’, which in no way presupposes the presence of
an external observer” [19] and could not understand the
logical absurdity of the LL jump. Even the EPR cor-
relation [24] could not shake the wrong belief of Bohr
and his followers. It must be obvious that non-locality
of the EPR correlation precludes any possibility to inter-
pret the act of observation realistically as an interaction
with measuring instrument. Nevertheless Bohr tried to
save his quantum postulate and his complementarity. In
his reply [51] on the EPR paper [24] Bohr criticizes the
EPR criterion of the existence of an element of physical
reality: ”· · · the wording of the above mentioned crite-
rion · · · contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of
the expression ’without in any way disturbing a system’.
Of course there is in a case like that just considered no
question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under
investigation during the last critical stage of the measur-
ing procedure. But even at this stage there is essentially
the question of an influence on the very conditions which
define the possible types of predictions regarding the fu-
ture behaviour of the system · · · their argumentation does
not ’justify their conclusion that quantum mechanical de-
scription is essentially incomplete · · · This description
may be characterized as a rational utilization of all pos-
sibilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements,
compatible with the finite and uncontrollable interaction
between the objects and the measuring instruments in the
field of quantum theory”.
This criticism is very obscure and Bell quoting it writes
in [27]: ”Indeed I have very little idea what this means. I
do not understand in what sense the word ’mechanical’ is
used, in characterising the disturbances which Bohr does
not contemplate, as distinct from those which he does.
I do not know what the passage means - ’an influence
on the very conditions · · ·’. Could it mean just that
different experiments on the first system give different
kinds of information about the second? But this was just
one of the main points of EPR, who observed that one
could learn either the position or the momentum of the
second system. And then I do not understand the final
reference to ’uncontrollable interactions between measur-
ing instruments and objects’, it seems just to ignore the
essential point of EPR that in the absence of action at
a distance, only the first system could be supposed dis-
turbed by the first measurement and yet definite predic-
tions become possible for the second system. Is Bohr just
rejecting the premise - ’no action at a distance’ - rather
than refuting the argument?” Indeed, Bohr could save his
quantum postulate and his complementarity only reject-
ing the premise - ’no action at a distance’. ”The quantum
postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenom-
ena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-
vation not to be neglected” [23]. EPR had proposed a
method of the observation, for example, by Alice the spin
state of the distant particle flying toward Bob at which
no interaction between the agency of observation of Alice
and the Bob’s particle can be assumed without action at
a distance between they. The Bohr’s complementarity
can be valid also if only the premise - ’no action at a
distance’ could be rejected. This action should be real
because of the reality of an interaction with the agency of
observation which belongs to the ’res extensa’, as well as
any quantum object. The mind of Alice and Bob belong
to the ’res cogitans’. But the quantum postulate and
complementarity exclude an interaction with the mind
of the observer. Bohr and his followers objectivated (in
the meaning of the true definition) the act of observation,
the Dirac jump and even the EPR correlation. The ob-
jectiveness of the EPR correlation implies a real action
at a distance between the ’res extensa’ contradicting to
the relativity. The neglect by sleepwalkers this essential
conflict ”between the two fundamental pillars of contem-
porary theory” has resulted to mass delusion.
4.2. The mass delusion and the idea of quantum
computation
This mass delusion shows itself, in particular, in the
idea of quantum computation enjoying wide popularity
now [48]. The widespread interest in this idea seems quite
valid. The minimal sizes of nanostructures come nearer
to atomic level and subsequent miniaturization will not
be possible in the near future. Therefore exponential in-
crease of calculating resources with number of quantum
bits has provoked almost boundless enthusiasm. This
exponential increase seems possible thanks to the princi-
ple of superposition of states, interpreted as the cardinal
positive principle of the QM [19]. Feynman [52] proposed
universal simulation, i.e. a purpose-built quantum sys-
tem which could simulate the physical behaviour of any
other, noting that the calculation complexity of quantum
system increases exponentially with number N of its ele-
ments. Indeed, the number gN = 2
N − 1 of independent
variables γj describing, for example, the spin 1/2 states
of N particle
ψ = γ1| ↑↑↑ ... ↑> +γ2| ↑↑↑ ... ↓> +...
+γgN−1| ↓↓↓ ... ↑> +γgN | ↓↓↓ ... ↓> (15)
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increases exponentially with the number of these particles
thanks to the EPR correlation.
The Feynman’s idea of simulation was based on his be-
lief in QM as an universal theory. But this belief is false.
The idea of universal quantum computer was proposed
by David Deutsch ”as a way to experimentally test the
’Many Universes Theory’ of quantum physics - the idea
that when a particle changes, it changes into all possible
forms, across multiple universes” [53]. There is impor-
tant to remind that the concept of multiple universes was
proposed by Hugh Everett [14] in order to describe the
Process 1, i.e. the act of observation out the domain of
psychology, i.e. without the mind of the observer. In the
early 1990’s several authors sought computational tasks
which could be solved by a quantum computer more effi-
ciently than any classical computer. Shor has described
in 1994 [54] an algorithm which was not only efficient
on a quantum computer, but also addressed a central
problem in computer science: that of factorising large
integers. This possibility has provoked mass enthusiasm.
But most authors of numerous publication on quantum
computation ignore the statement of the author of this
idea that quantum computer can be real only in multiple
universes. Deutsch writes in his book [55]: ”For whose
who still thinks that there is only one universe I offer
the following problem: to explain a principle of action of
the Shor’s algorithm. I do not request to predict that it
will work, as for this purpose it is enough to solve some
consistent equations. I ask you to give an explanation.
When the Shor’s algorithm has factorized number, hav-
ing involved about 10500 computing resources which can be
seen where this number was factorized on multipliers? In
whole visible universe exists in all about 1080 atoms, the
number is insignificant small in comparison with 10500.
Thus, if the visible universe was a whole physical reality,
the physical reality even is remote would not contain re-
sources, sufficient for factorization on multipliers of such
big number”.
This contradiction between the author of the idea of
quantum computation and numerous authors of publica-
tions about quantum computation is consequence of the
robust common sense intrinsic not only the authors [26]
but almost all physicists. Deutsch, as well as Everett,
understands that the problem of ’observation’ in the or-
thodox QM ”cannot be ruled out as lying in the domain
of psychology” [14] and only the idea of multiple universes
can deliver from this nonsense. In contrast to Deutsch
and Everett most authors believing Heisenberg and Bohr,
who had obscured the logically obvious fact, spurn such
mind-boggling fantasies as both the many world interpre-
tation and the mind of the observer having an influence
on quantum system at observation. The belief in the
soothing philosophy or religion of Heisenberg-Bohr is so
thoughtless that believers refuse to admit that the nu-
merous independent variables γj in the EPR correlation
(15) describe the knowledge of an observer. It must be
obvious from the fact that the huge number gN = 2
N −1
decreases twice, for example approximately on 101000 at
the number of quantum bits N ≈ 2303, when the ob-
server observes the spine state only one particle.
Our mind, in a certain relation, is much more rich than
our empirical knowledge. We can write any big number,
for example 101000, 1010000000, 101000000000, and even to
set yourself a task to factorized it on multipliers with help
of the Shor’s algorithm. But it does not mean, that this
task can be solved with help of a real device, quantum
computer, in a reality of one universe. It could be possi-
ble only if a real action on distance, violating relativistic
causality, could be possible. The violations [45–47] of
the Bell’s inequalities give experimental evidence of ”a
gross violation of relativistic causality”, p. 171 in [1], for
results of observations. The EPR correlation describes
just this violation. But the experimental results [45–47]
and any others can not give evidence that the EPR cor-
relation describes a real action on distance between the
’res extensa’, existing outside of and independently of the
’res cogitans’, i.e. the mind of the observer. Authors of
numerous publications about quantum computation ob-
jectivate without hesitation quantum bits and quantum
gates doing not suspect about conflict with relativistic
causality and even with the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum theory. In the Section ”The Copenhagen
Interpretation of Quantum Theory” of [31] Heisenberg
stated ”that certainly our knowledge can change suddenly
and that this fact justifies the use of the term ’quantum
jump’”. Just this sudden change of our knowledge at ob-
servation results to non-locality of the EPR correlation
and the conflict between the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum theory with relativistic causality. Heisenberg
noted also in this Section that ”there is no description
of what happens to the system between the initial obser-
vation and the next measurement” [31]. Thus, according
to the Copenhagen interpretation QM can not describe
a process of quantum computation which should be just
before the next measurement. Both the EPR correlation
and quantum computation can not be possible accord-
ing to hidden-variables theories. Deutsch is quite right
that quantum computer can be real only in a reality of
multiple universes.
4.3. Two principal mistakes of Heisenberg
The Heisenberg’s point of view was inconsistent. On
the one hand he understood that ”if a interaction of a
system with the measuring apparatus is treated as a whole
according to quantum mechanics and if both are regarded
as cut off from the rest of the world, then the formalism of
quantum theory does not as a rule lead to a define result”
[31]. But on the other hand he did not want to admit
the presence of subjectivity in his pet quantum mechan-
ics. Although the subjectivity follows logically and in-
evitably from his understanding that ’quantum jump’ of
the measuring apparatus can not be spontaneous. Try-
ing to deny subjective features of QM Heisenberg was
forced to use obscure declarations, for example: ”The
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observer has, rather, only the function of registering de-
cisions, i.e. processes in space and time, and it does not
matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human
being; but the registration, i.e. the transition from the
’possible’ to the ’actual’ is absolutely necessary here and
can not be omitted from the interpretation of quantum
theory. At this point quantum theory is intrinsically con-
nected with thermodynamics in so far as every act of ob-
servation is by its very nature an irreversible process; it is
only through such irreversible processes that the formal-
ism of quantum theory can be consistently connected with
actual events in space and time” [31]. This explanation is
very obscure! Any apparatus belongs to the ’res extensa’
whereas a human being belongs to the ’res cogitans’. An
answer on the question ”What or who is the observer, the
’res extensa’ or the ’res cogitans’?” should be decisive for
the essence of QM. But Heisenberg ignores this question
because he understands that no apparatus can induce the
transition from the ’possible’ to the ’actual’. This tran-
sition can be only in the mind of a human being. But
Heisenberg did not want to admit this subjective feature
of QM.
The proclaim resemblance of QM and thermodynamics
distracts the attention from the principal problem and
has misled many physicists, in particular Landau [19].
The principal problem was raised by Bell in his paper
”On the problem of hidden variables in quantum me-
chanics” [42]: ”To know the quantum mechanical state of
a system implies, in general, only statistical restrictions
on the results of measurements. It seems interesting to
ask if this statistical element be thought of as arising,
as in classical statistical mechanics, because the states in
question are averages over better defined states for which
individually the results would be quite determined”. Bell
in this work had given the answer of the principal ques-
tion ”What or who is the observer?” If all quantum phe-
nomena can be described using better defined states for
which individually the results would be quite determined,
i.e. ’hidden variables’ than the observer is an apparatus.
But in this case the orthodox QM proposed by Heisen-
berg is observably inadequate. It may be adequate if
”atomic and subatomic particles do not have any definite
properties in advance of observation” [27]. In this case
the observer must be the mind of a human being because
no apparatus can create definite properties when they do
not exist in advance of observation. Any apparatus can
only change properties and make they hidden.
The vagueness of QM is a consequence of logical
mistakes made by young Heisenberg. Einstein warned
against one of they. Heisenberg remembered [56] that af-
ter his talk at the Berlin university in 1926 Einstein has
told him that ”from the fundamental point of view the in-
tention to create a theory only on observable parameters
completely ridiculously. Because in the real all is quite
the contrary. Only the theory can decide what exactly
can be observable. As you can see, observation, generally
speaking, is very complicated process”. In 63 years later
Bell wrote: ”Einstein said that it is theory which decides
what is ’observable’. I think he was right - ’observation’ is
a complicated and theory-laden business. Then that no-
tion should not appear in the formulation of fundamental
theory” [24]. Einstein and Bell asserted fairly that the
offer by Heisenberg to describe only observable parame-
ters rather has complicated than has simplified the task
of theory. The description of observation results can not
be complete without a description of the act of observa-
tion. Therefore it is easier to create a theory describing
”real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any
act of observation or substantiation)” [50] than a theory
describing observation results. The vagueness of the no-
tion about observation (measurement) is principal cause
of the fundamental obscurity in quantum. Bell was right
when he stated that ”On this list of bad words from good
books, the worst of all is ’measurement’”. Heisenberg
proposing to describe observation results could not even
formulate enough clear what is observation.
This logical mistake is result of other fundamen-
tal mistake concerning his conception of human think-
ing. Heisenberg noted: ”This basis of the philosophy
of Descartes is radically different from that of the an-
cient Greek philosophers. Here the starting point is not
a fundamental principle or substance, but the attempt of
a fundamental knowledge. And Descartes realises that
what we know about our mind is more certain than what
we know about the outer world” [31]. But Heisenberg
himself seems to do not realise that our knowledge about
our mind is more certain than about the outer world.
Only therefore he could contest the logical conclusion by
Kant that the law of causality is a priori form of our
mind and the basis of all scientific work. The vagueness
and self-contradiction of QM prove that rather Kant than
Heisenberg was right. Considering the law of causality
Heisenberg wrote: ”Kant says that whenever we observe
an event we assume that there is a foregoing event from
which the other event must follow according to some rule”
[31]. This conclusion by Kant about human thinking
is confirmed with an interesting discussion between cre-
ators of quantum mechanics at the Solvay meeting 1927,
which Bohr remembered in 1949 [40]: ”On that occasion
an interesting discussion arose also about how to speak
of the appearance of phenomena for which only predic-
tions of statistical character can be made. The question
was whether, as to the occurrence of individual effects,
we should adopt a terminology proposed by Dirac, that
we were concerned with a choice on the part of ’nature’
or, as suggested by Heisenberg, we should say that we
have to do with a choice on the part of the ”observer”
constructing the measuring instruments and reading their
recording. Any such terminology would, however, appear
dubious since, on the one hand, it is hardly reasonable to
endow nature with volition in the ordinary sense, while,
on the other hand, it is certainly not possible for the ob-
server to influence the events which may appear under
the conditions he has arranged”.
Here three principal creators of QM discuss what is
the cause of the appearance of phenomena. None of they
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state the absence of the cause, even Heisenberg. Almost
30 years later Heisenberg calls in question that the Kant’s
conclusion ”Since we actually apply this method, the law
of causality is ’a priori’ and is not derived from expe-
rience” [31] may be true in atomic physics. Heisenberg
considers a radium atom, which can emit an α-particle
states ”The time for the emission of the α-particle cannot
be predicted” [31]. Next he asks ”But why has the scien-
tific method actually changed in this very fundamental
question since Kant?”, gives two answers one of they is
”We have been convinced by experience that the laws of
quantum theory are correct and, if they are, we know that
a foregoing event as cause for the emission at a given time
cannot be found” and concludes ”Therefore, Kant’s argu-
ments for the a priori character of the law of causality no
longer apply” [31]. This Heisenberg’s conclusion is abso-
lutely ill-founded because he considers the ’res extensa’
whereas Kant considered the ’res cogitans’, human mind.
The Kant’s conclusion that the law of causality is ’a pri-
ori’ is ’a priori’. Therefore neither experience nor theory
describing correctly this experience can call this conclu-
sion in question. The negation of a cause in ’nature’, i.e.
the terminology proposed by Dirac results inevitably to
the suggestion by young Heisenberg that the ’observer’ is
the cause of the occurrence of individual effects. Just this
suggestion results to the EPR paradox, the Schrodinger’s
cat paradox, the questions ”Whose knowledge and whose
will?”, considered above, and other nonsense.
5. FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES BECAUSE OF
THE PREJUDICE OF THE QM UNIVERSALITY
The fundamental obscurity in QM discussed during al-
most ninety years is connected with the vague notion
about the act of observation, i.e. the Process 1 accord-
ing to Everett [14]. The description of the Process 1
should lie in the domain of psychology [14]. Therefore
it is very important to draw reader’s attention that the
act of observation is absent at the description of most
quantum phenomena. It was noted in the Introduction
that already Feynman had become aware of the appli-
cability of the realistic interpretation of wave function
proposed by Schrodinger for description of macroscopic
quantum phenomena. But he did not understand the
fundamental importance of this fact. Anyone can easy
see that not only macroscopic quantum phenomena are
described with the Schrodinger interpretation, i.e. with-
out the Process 1, the mind of the observer and other
mysticism. Schrodinger had introduced the term ’wave
function’ for his interpretation and used, as well as Ein-
stein [50], the term ’ψ - function’ [33] for the positivistic
interpretation proposed by Born. The terms ’wave func-
tion’ ΨSh and ’ψ - function’ ΨB will be used below in the
same sense. It would be useful to categorise the quan-
tum phenomena described the ’wave function’ and the ’ψ
- function’. QM uses the ’ψ - function’ when the Dirac
jump is used at the description and the ’wave function’
when the Dirac jump is absent.
5.1. The Aharonov - Bohm effects are described
both with the ψ - functions and the wave function
For example, the Dirac jump is used for the descrip-
tion of the two-slit interference experiment demonstrat-
ing particle - wave duality at observation. The interfer-
ence pattern, for example electrons observed on a detect-
ing screen [57], testifies to that electrons pass through
the double-slit as a wave with the de Broglie wave-
length λdeB = 2pi~/mv. But the same electrons man-
ifest itself as particles at they arrival at the detecting
screen [57], see also Fig.1-3 in the book [16]. QM de-
scribes this observed duality with help of the ψ func-
tion ΨB = ΨB1 +ΨB2 which is the superposition of two
ψ - functions ΨB1 = A1e
iϕ1 , ΨB2 = A2e
iϕ2 describing
two possible path L1, L2 of electrons through the first
and second slits with the amplitudes A1 and A2 of the
arrival probability at the point y of a particle passing
through the first and second slit. Then, the probability
P (y) = |ΨB|
2 of the electron arrival at a point y of the
detecting screen, Fig.3,
P (y) = A21 + A
2
2 + 2A1A2 cos(∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ2) (16)
should depend on the phase difference ∆ϕ1 − ∆ϕ2.
Y. Aharonov and D. Bohm had noted more than
fifty years ago [58] that this phase difference ∆ϕ1 −
∆ϕ2 =
∫ y
S
dr1(p/~) −
∫ y
S
dr2(p/~) =
∫ y
S
dr1(mv/~) −∫ y
S dr1(mv/~) +
∮
dr(eA/~) = 2pi(L1 − L2)/λdeB +
2piΦ/Φ0 and consequently the probability (16) should
change with magnetic flux Φ inside the closed contour
S − L1 − y − L2 − S, Fig.1, because of the relation
p = mv + qA between canonical momentum p and elec-
tron q = e velocity v in the presence of a magnetic vector
potential A. The interference pattern shift with the flux
Φ change was corroborated by many experiments [59].
The value of the probability (16) oscillates with the pe-
riod equal the flux quantum Φ0 = 2pi~/q.
The periodicity because of the Aharonov - Bohm effect
[59], i.e. because of the relation ~∇ϕ = p = mv + qA,
are observed also in normal metal [60] and superconduc-
tor [62, 63, 75] loops. But this effect differs in essence
from the case of the two-slit interference experiment.
The periodical dependencies in magnetic flux Φ with pe-
riod Φ0 = 2pi~/q are observed in the mesoscopic rings
[60, 62, 63, 75] because of the quantization of velocity
circulation
∮
l
dlv =
2pi~
m
(n−
Φ
Φ0
) (17)
The quantization (17) is deduced from the requirement
that the complex wave function must be single-valued
ΨSh = |ΨSh| exp iϕ = |ΨSh| exp i(ϕ+ n2pi) at any point.
Because of this requirement, the phase ϕ must change by
integral n multiples of 2pi following a complete turn along
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FIG. 3: The Ahronov-Bohm effects in the two-slit interference
experiment (on the left) and in in normal metal or supercon-
ductor ring (on the right) are consequence of the magnetic flux
Φ influence on the phase difference ∆ϕ1−∆ϕ2 =
∮
l
dl∇ϕ. In
the first case the difference ∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ2 of the phase changes
between S and y points along upper L1 way ∆ϕ1 and lower L2
way ∆ϕ2 should not be divisible by 2pi (∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ2 6= n2pi)
since the ψ function collapses at the observation of the elec-
tron arrival in a point y of the detector screen. In contrast
to the interference experiment the Ahronov-Bohm effects in
mesoscopic ring (for instance the persistent current) are ob-
served because of the requirement ∆ϕ1 − ∆ϕ2 = n2pi since
the wave function, describing this case, can not collapse
the path of integration, yielding
∮
l dl ▽ ϕ =
∮
l dlp/~ =∮
l
dl(mv + qA)/~ = m
∮
l
dlv/~+ 2piΦ/Φ0 = n2pi.
This requirement is violated at the description of the
two-slit interference experiment because of the collapse
of the ψ - function (the Dirac jump) at the observa-
tion of the electron arrival in a point y of the detector
screen. The phase difference ∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ2 =
∫ y
S dr1∇ϕ −∫ y
S
dr2∇ϕ =
∮
l
dr∇ϕ and the probability (16) can change
uninterruptedly with the coordinate y and magnetic flux
Φ thanks to the collapse. This uninterrupted variation
provides the interference pattern (16) and its shift with
Φ. Thus, although the both Aharonov - Bohm effects re-
sult from the Φ influence on the phase variation along a
closed path
∮
l dr∇ϕ they differ fundamentally: the first
one should be described with the ψ - function whereas the
second one should be described with the wave function
[64].
The ignorance about this fundamental difference pro-
vokes mistakes. For example, the authors [65] have con-
cluded that electrons can be reflected because of mag-
netic flux Φ in the Aharonov-Bohm ring, in defiance of
the law of momentum conservation [8]. The contradic-
tion in such scandalous form is absent in the Aharonov -
Bohm effect [58], although there is a problem with non-
local force free momentum transfer [16, 66]. In spite of
the change in the interference pattern no overall deflec-
tion of electrons is observed in the Aharonov-Bohm effect
because of magnetic flux [16]. The transmission (reflec-
tion) probability Ptr =
∫
dyP (y) =
∫
dx(A21 + A
2
2) = 1
can not depend at all on magnetic flux Φ contrary to the
erroneous theoretical result shown on Fig.2 in [65]. The
mistake [65] is one of consequences of the prejudice of the
QM universality [7].
5.2. We can believe for the time being in reality of
the moon
Even macroscopic realism was called in question be-
cause of this prejudice. Bell noted that creators of QM
”despair of finding any consistent space-time picture of
what goes on the atomic and subatomic scale” [27]. ”For
example [67], Bohr once declared when asked whether
the quantum mechanical algorithm could be considered
as somehow mirroring an underlying quantum reality:
’There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract
quantum mechanical description. It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics
concerns what we can say about Nature’” [27]. The cre-
ators of QM disclaimed reality only on the atomic and
subatomic scale. Recently this scepticism about realism
was expanded to macroscopic level [11]. The authors
[11] quoting the known remark by Albert Einstein ”I like
to think that the moon is there even if I don’t look at it”
claims that some experimental results obtained on super-
conducting circuit [68] could refute this trust by Einstein
in objective reality even on the macroscopic level. This
scandalized claim bears a direct relation to the problem
of a possibility of superconducting quantum bits [69]. A
small moon, which is not there according to [11], is a
magnetic flux inside a superconducting loop [70] which
is considered as flux qubit in numerous publications [69]
including the one [71] of the author of the scandalized
claim [11]. The authors [11] believes paradoxically that
QM can prove that nothing is there but it is possible to
create anything, superconducting quantum bits [71] for
example, using this nothing. Ironically, quantum bits can
be created indeed only if quantum systems do not have
any definite properties in advance of observation.
Only basis both of the doubt in macroscopic reality
[11] and of the reality of superconducting quantum bits
[69, 71] is the Leggett-Garg inequality referred to as a
Bell’s inequality in time [11, 68]. A.J. Leggett and A.
Garg [70] have concocted the contradiction with real-
ism extremely unsuccessful. The doubt about reality of
macroscopic magnetic flux in rf SQUID, i.e. a supercon-
ducting loop interrupted by Josephson junction, is pro-
voked in [70] only because of ψ - function usage in ad-
ditional to the wave function describing superconducting
state. ψ - function can apply speculatively for description
of any macroscopic object, for example the cat [33] or the
moon [49]. But realism must not be called in question
without irrefutable empirical evidence obtained on the
base of no-hidden-variables theorem (or, vulgarly, ’no-go
theorem’) [43].
The superconducting loop interrupted by Josephson
junction, considered in [70], has two permitted states
with the same minimal energy and opposite directed su-
perconducting current (the persistent current Ip), when
external magnetic flux inside its loop is divisible by half
Φ = (n+0.5)Φ0 of the flux quantum Φ0 = 2pi~/q, see the
relation (17). Imitating Bell, A.J. Leggett and A. Garg
[70] have offered inequalities which experimental check
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should prove the contradiction with any realistic theory
and the necessity of the positivistic description with help
of superposition of states, which should collapse at obser-
vation. The no-go theorem by A.J. Leggett and A. Garg
[70] is false because of some reasons. First of all there is
not a well-grounded motive to call macroscopic realism in
question because rather the realistic Schrodinger’s than
positivistic Born’s interpretation of the wave function is
valid for description of macroscopic quantum phenom-
ena. The authors [70] as well many others [69, 71, 73]
liken superconducting loop to spin 1/2 and assume su-
perposition of its two permitted states, described as the
superposition of the spin states ψ = α| ↑> +β| ↓>.
This likening is obviously false because of some reasons.
First of all because superconducting loop is flat and the
magnetic moment Mm = IpS of the current Ip circu-
lating in it anticlockwise or clockwise and the angular
momentum of Cooper pairs Mp = (2me/e)IpS are one-
dimensional. The assumption [69–71, 73] of superposi-
tion of states with different value of the one-dimensional
angular momentum contradicts to formalism of QM [19]
even if the one-dimensional angular momentum is micro-
scopic. Therefore it is very strange that A.J. Leggett
and A. Garg [70] and other authors [69, 71, 73] could as-
sume superposition of states with macroscopically differ-
ent ∆Mp ≈ 10
5
~ angular momentum. This assumption
contradicts obviously to the fundamental law of angular
momentum conservation [72] and is much more incon-
ceivable than superposition of the cat’s states, at least of
the Schrodinger’s cat (9). Besides the authors [70] repeat
virtually the mistake [42, 43] of the von Neumann’s no-
hidden-variables proof. Thus, the doubt in macroscopic
realism [11, 70] is absolutely baseless and was provoked
with misinterpretation of QM as a theory describing uni-
versally all quantum phenomena. We can believe as be-
fore in reality of the moon.
6. FUNDAMENTAL OBSCURITY CONNECTED
WITH WAVE FUNCTION USAGE
The wave function describes a real situation (as it sup-
posedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or
substantiation) in accordance with the programmatic aim
of all physics upheld by Einstein [50]. Therefore the fun-
damental obscurity connected with the Born’s interpre-
tation is absent at the description of macroscopic and
some other quantum phenomena. But there is different
fundamental obscurity, more real than the one connected
with violation of the Bell’s inequalities. In spite of this
obscurity, the universally recognised quantum formalism
describes almost all effects observed in superconductor
structures. But some experimental results obtained re-
cently contradict to its predictions.
6.1. Puzzles generated with the quantum
formalism
The real situation, described with the wave function
ΨSh = |ΨSh| exp iϕ, can not change because of our look,
but it can alter with help of a real physical influence.
For example, we can decrease the density of Cooper pairs
|ΨSh|
2 = ns = ns,0(1 − T/Tc) down to ns = 0 at a time
t = ton, overheating a loop segment B above supercon-
ducting transition T > Tc, for example with help of laser
beam, Fig.4. The electric field E = −▽V ≈ VB/(l− lB)
of the potential voltage
VB = RBI(t) = RBIp exp−
t− ton
τRL
(18)
appeared because of a non-zero resistance RB > 0 of
the B segment in normal state, will decrease the veloc-
ity of Cooper pairs from the quantum value (17), equal
v = −2pi~/lm4 at the magnetic flux inside the loop
Φ = Φ0/4, down to zero v = 0, during the relaxation
time τRL = L/RB. Ip = s2ensv is the persistent current
observed because of the quantization (17); s = hw is the
loop section; L is the inductance of the loop with a length
l. This velocity change occurs in accordance with the
Newton’s second law mdv/dt = 2eE, under the influence
of the real force FE = 2eE acting on each Cooper pair.
According to the universally recognised quantum formal-
ism the velocity in all loop segment, including the A one,
Fig.4, must return to the initial value v = −2pi~/lm4
corresponding the permitted state (17) with minimum
energy ∝ (n−Φ/Φ0)
2 after turning off of the laser beam
at a time toff and the cooling of the B segment down
to the initial temperature T < Tc, see the left picture on
Fig.4. The pair velocity in the segment A should change
without a real force at the change of the real situation in
the spatially separated segment B, Fig.4, because of the
prohibition (17) of the zero velocity v = 0 at Φ 6= nΦ0.
The quantum formalism can not explain this non-local
force-free momentum transfer. It can only describe phe-
nomena connected with it.
The direct component
Vdc =
1
Θ
∫
Θ
dtVB(t) ≈ LωswIp; at ωswτRL ≪ 1 (19a)
Vdc ≈ RBIp; at ωswτRL ≫ 1 (19b)
of the voltage (12) should be observed at repeated switch-
ing with a frequency ωsw of the B segment, Fig.4, be-
tween superconducting and normal states, because of the
returning of the loop to the same state n at each B cool-
ing [74]. The sign and value of the dc voltage (19) should
vary periodically with magnetic flux Vdc(Φ/Φ0) like the
persistent current Ip(Φ/Φ0) [75], because of the change
of the quantum number n corresponding to minimum en-
ergy ∝ (n−Φ/Φ0)
2 at Φ = (n+0.5)Φ0 [76]. Such quan-
tum oscillations of the dc voltage Vdc(Φ/Φ0) ∝ Ip(Φ/Φ0)
were observed on segments of asymmetric aluminium
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FIG. 4: Superconducting loop can be switched between the
states with different connectivity of the wave function ΨSh =
|ΨSh| exp iϕ with a real physical influence, for example turn-
ing on (the right picture) and turning off (the left picture) of
the laser beam heating the loop segment B above Tc. The per-
sistent current, equal Ip = −s2ens(2pi~/lm4) in a symmetric
loop l with the same section s and pair density ns along the
whole l, flows at the magnetic flux Φ = Φ0/4 inside l when
the wave function is closed (the left picture). The current cir-
culating in the loop should decay during the relaxation time
τRL = L/RB after the transition in the state with unclosed
wave function because of a non-zero resistance RB > 0 of the
B segment in the normal state (the right picture). The photo
of a real aluminum loop is used in order to exhibit that the
gedankenexperiment can be made real.
rings when the switching take place because of noise
[77–80] or ac current [62, 81]. The experimental results
[78, 79] give unequivocal evidence that the persistent cur-
rent can flow against the dc electric field E = − ▽ V .
This puzzle may be connected with the other one: the
observations [62, 63, 75, 78, 79, 82] of the persistent cur-
rent Ip(Φ/Φ0) at a non-zero resistance Rl > 0. An elec-
tric current should decay during a very short relaxation
time τRL = L/Rl < 10
−9 s without Faraday’s voltage
−dΦ/dt = 0 in the aluminium ring, used in [75, 78, 79],
with radius r ≈ 1 µm, the inductance L ≈ 10−11 H , at
resistance Rl > 0.01 Ω. In defiance of this the persistent
current does not decay [75, 78, 79].
This puzzles can be described in the limits of the quan-
tum formalism taking into account that the angular mo-
mentum
∮
l
dlp =
∮
l
dl(mv+2eA) = m
∮
l
dlv+2eΦ of each
Cooper pair should change from 2eΦ to n2pi~ because
of the quantization at each closing of superconducting
state in the ring. This change of pair momentum p in
a time unit at repeated switching with a frequency ωsw
was called in [83] ”quantum force” Fq:∮
l
dlFq = 2pi~(n−
Φ
Φ0
)ωsw (20)
at ωsw ≪ 1/τRL. The quantum force
∮
l
dlFq takes the
place of the Faraday’s voltage −dΦ/dt which maintains
IRl = −dΦ/dt a conventional current I circulating in a
loop and describes why the persistent current can not
decay IpRl =
∮
l
dlFq/2e in spite of the power dissipation
I2pRl. Under equilibrium condition the Ip 6= 0 at Rl > 0
is observed only in a narrow temperature region near
superconducting transition T ≈ Tc [75, 78, 79], where
thermal fluctuations can switch loop segments between
superconducting ns > 0, R = 0 and normal ns = 0,
R > 0 states [83].
The first experimental evidence of the force-free an-
gular momentum transfer was obtained as far back as
1933 when Meissner and Ochsenfeld [84] observed first
that a superconductor, placed in a weak magnetic field
B < Bc1, completely expels the field from the supercon-
ducting material except for a thin layer λL ≈ 50 nm =
5 10−8 m at the surface. The quantum formalism de-
scribes the Meissner effect as the particular case n = 0
of the flux quantization Φ = nΦ0 = 0 [64] but can not
explain the puzzle. In the case, considered on Fig.4, the
angular momentum change of single pair n2pi~− 2eΦ =
2pi~(n − Φ/Φ0) ≤ 2pi~ 0.5 is microscopic irrespective of
the loop l = 2pir radius r and the Φ = Bpir2 value.
At the Meissner effect observed at any radius r of su-
perconductor and any B < Bc1, this change is macro-
scopic 2pi~(−Φ/Φ0) = 2pi~(−Bpir
2/Φ0) ≈ −~ 10
15 at
the first critical field Bc1 ≈ 0.1 T and the superconduc-
tor radius r = 1 m. This obscurity is macroscopic in
truth because of the angular momentum change of all
Ns = nspir
2h > 1029 pairs in a cylindrical superconduc-
tor. Jorge Hirsch wonders fairly that ”the question of
what is the ’force’ propelling the mobile charge carriers
and the ions in the superconductor to move in direction
opposite to the electromagnetic force in the Meissner ef-
fect was essentially never raised nor answered” [85]. He
proposes an explanation of the Meissner effect puzzle [85].
But some consequences of this explanation, for example
the electric field inside the superconductor, the relation
(23) in [85], seem unacceptable.
According to the point of view by Hirsch [86] the force-
free momentum transfer indicates a fundamental problem
with the conventional theory of superconductivity [87]. I
think that it indicates a fundamental problem rather with
QM as a whole than with a theory of superconductivity
[88]. The persistent current Ip 6= 0 is observed at R > 0
not only in superconductor [75, 78, 79] but also in normal
metal rings [60]. In order to dodge the obvious puzzle the
authors [60] and the author [89] claim that the electric
current can flow in realistic normal metal rings contain-
ing atomic defects, grain boundaries, and other kinds of
static disorder without dissipating energy. They do not
try even to explain how a dissipationless current of elec-
trons can be possible at electron mean free path shorter
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than the circle length of their rings [60]. The authors
[60] find a pretext for the dropping of the obvious puz-
zle using a familiar analog in atomic physics: a current
circulating around the atom although the exponential de-
crease of the persistent current amplitude with temper-
ature increase, Fig.3 in [60], testifies against this analog
and to fundamental differences between application of
some quantum principles on atomic and mesoscopic lev-
els [90]. Igor Kulik, who has described the possibility of
Ip 6= 0 at R > 0 as far back as 1970 both in supercon-
ductor [91] and normal metal rings [92] made forty years
ago reasonable statement that the taking into account of
a dissipation should not result in the disappearance of
the persistent current. The observation [78, 79] of the
persistent current flowing against dc electric field con-
firms the Kulik’s statement and makes meaningless [78]
the preposterous claim by the authors [60, 89].
The authors [60, 89] turn a blind eye also to the other
puzzle. It is known that ”time-reversal symmetry should
forbid a current choosing one direction over the other
around the ring” [89]. According to [60, 89] ”A magnetic
flux Φ threading the ring will break time-reversal sym-
metry, allowing the PC to flow in a particular direction
around the ring” [60]. But the Ip [60, 75] and E = −▽Vp
[78, 79] direction changes not only with the Φ direction
but also with its value at Φ = nΦ0 and Φ = (n+ 0.5)Φ0.
Each physicist must understand that the observation of
the direction change with the value change is a puzzle
which may have a fundamental importance [93–95]. Such
puzzle was not observed on the atomic level because of
the inaccessibly high magnetic fields Φ0/pir
2
B ≈ 5 10
9 G
needed for this.
6.2. Experimental results which can not be
describe with help of the quantum formalism
According to the criterion of demarcation between
what is and is not genuinely scientific by Karl Popper:
a theory should be considered scientific if and only if it
is falsifiable. Therefore any experimental results contra-
dicting to the quantum formalism should be at the centre
of attention. I would like to draw reader’s attention to
two of such results. According to the quantum formalism
(17) two permitted states n and n+1 of superconducting
loop should be observed at Φ = (n+0.5)Φ0 at the single-
shot measurement. Some experimental results [96, 97]
corroborate this prediction but other one [97] contradict
to it. The χ-shaped crossing observed in [97] and mis-
interpreted [98] by the authors as the single-shot read-
out of macroscopic quantum superposition of ’flux qubit’
[69, 71] states challenges the quantum formalism forbid-
ding the state with v = 0 (17) at Φ = (n+0.5)Φ0. Other
challenge has been revealed at measurements of magnetic
dependencies of the critical current of asymmetric super-
conducting rings [62, 99–101]. According to the quan-
tum formalism (17) the critical current anisotropy should
appear in the asymmetric ring because of a change of
the functions describing its magnetic dependencies, see
Fig.19 [62] and Fig.3 [100]. But the measurements have
revealed that the asymmetry appears because of changes
in the arguments of the functions rather than the func-
tions themselves [62, 99, 100].
7. CONCLUSION
The history of QM demonstrates clearly that no
successfulness of a theory can guarantee its accuracy.
Most physicists believed in QM and disregarded the
pointed criticism of Einstein, Schrodinger, Bell and oth-
ers who tried to explain that the proposal of Heisen-
berg to describe observables instead of beables and the
Born’s interpretation of the wave function are inade-
quate. They strode unimpeded through the fundamental
obscurity and non-universal validity quantum principles.
Schrodinger pointed out, for example, the non-universal
validity of the complementarity and uncertainty princi-
ples. According to Bohr ”the study of the complementary
phenomena demands mutually exclusive experimental ar-
rangements” [40] But the method of momentum p = mv
measurement, learned in the primary school, disproves
this statement. According to this method the momentum
p = m(z2 − z1)/(t2 − t1) is measured with help of mea-
surement of the time t1 and t2 when the particle passes
points z1 and z2. Thus, the experimental arrangements
for the measurement of position and momentum are not
merely mutually non-exclusive but are the same. The
velocity value vz = z/t can be measured with the uncer-
tainty ∆vz ≈ vz(∆z/z + ∆t/t) at z = z2 − z1 ≫ ∆z,
t = t2 − t1 ≫ ∆t. Consequently, we can make the prod-
uct of the velocity ∆vz and position ∆z uncertainties
∆z∆vz ≈ ∆zvz(∆z/z + ∆t/t) how any small, contrary
to the Heisenberg uncertainty relation ∆z∆vz > ~/2m,
increasing the distance z = z2−z1 and the time t = z/vz.
The mass delusion concerning quantum mechanic is a
consequence of the optimistic point of view that the his-
tory of science is the history of progress. But it is also
the history of wrong belief. In the beginning of his talk
”Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics” p.
169 in [1] Bell cites a quotation from A. Koestler’s book
’The Sleepwalkers’ about of the Copernican revolution:
”· · · the history of cosmic theories may without exagger-
ation be called a history of collective obsessions and con-
trolled schizophrenias; and the manner in which some of
the most important individual discoveries were arrived at
reminds one of a sleepwalker’s performance ···.”. Accord-
ing to Bell and Koestler Copernicus, Kepler, and Galilei
”were not really aware of what they were doing · · · sleep-
walkers” p. 169 in [1]. This sleepwalking in the history
of QM is more evident. QM is the most successful the-
ory but it is also most obscure theory. The cause of this
obscurity is obvious and some experts denoted it, for ex-
ample Jaynes [102]: ”From this, it is pretty clear why
present quantum theory not only does not use - it does
not even dare to mention - the notion of a ’real physical
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situation’. Defenders of the theory say that this notion
is philosophically naive, a throwback to outmoded ways of
thinking, and that recognition of this constitutes deep new
wisdom about the nature of human knowledge. I say that
it con-stitutes a violent irrationality, that somewhere in
this theory the distinction between reality and our knowl-
edge of reality has become lost, and the result has more
the character of medieval necromancy than science” see
p. 231 in the book [16].
But most physicists continue to believe in QM. No sci-
ence can be possible without a faith. Scientists should,
at least, believe in the human capability to perceive the
outer world. But the belief should not be implicit. We
should understand that the EPR correlation and viola-
tion of the Bell’s inequalities rather cast doubt on the
our capability to perceive the outer world than give new
opportunities, for example quantum computation. Such
sensible view of things hardly may be possible without
the comprehension epistemological basic of science. Ein-
stein emphasised this: ”The reciprocal relationship of
epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They
are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without
contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science
without epistemology is - insofar as it is thinkable at all
- primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the
epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his
way through to such a system, than he is inclined to in-
terpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his
system and to reject whatever does not fit into his sys-
tem. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his
striving for epistemological systematic that far. He ac-
cepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis;
but the external conditions, which are set for him by the
facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be
too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual
world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He
therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as
a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as real-
ist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent
of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks
upon the concepts and theories as the free inventions of
the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is em-
pirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his
concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which
they furnish a logical representation of relations among
sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist
or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of
logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of
his research” [50].
The logical simplicity can not be attributable to QM.
Moreover this theory is remarkable for logical inconsis-
tency and non-universality. Even its fundamental obscu-
rities are no-universal. The fundamental obscurity un-
masked by Einstein, Schrodinger, Bell and other oppo-
nents of the positivism may be connected with the repu-
diation of realism. But even realistic description of many
quantum phenomena with help of the Schrodinger’s in-
terpretation of the wave function has fundamental obscu-
rities. We must conclude that a consistent and universal
theory of quantum phenomena is absent now. ”Could
such theory be created in principle?” is the question re-
quiring an answer first of all.
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